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ABSTRACT
"Big Data" is big business. Data brokers profit by tracking
consumers' information and behavior both on- and offline and using
this collected data to assign consumers evaluative scores and
classify consumers into segments. Companies then use these
consumer scores and segmentationsfor marketing and to determine
what deals, offers, and remedies they provide to different individuals.
These valuations and classifications are based on not only
consumers 'financial histories and relevant interests, but also their
race, gender, ZIP Code, social status, education,familial ties, and a
wide range of additional data. Nonetheless, consumers are largely
unaware of these scores and segmentations, and generally have no
way to challenge their veracity because they usually fall outside the
purview of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Moreover,
companies' use of these data devices may foster discriminationand
augment preexisting power imbalances among consumers by
funneling the best deals and remedies to the wealthiest and most
sophisticated consumers. Use of these scores and segmentations
increases the growing gap between powerful "haves" and
vulnerable "have-nots." This Article sheds light on these data
devices and aims to spark adoption of data privacy regulations that
protect all consumers regardless of their educational, economic,
ethnic, or social status.
* Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. I thank Kristen Carpenter, Paul Ohm, and Blake Reid for their helpful
comments, and Megan Coontz McAllister, Laurence Gendelman, Mary Sue
Greenleaf, and Danyelle McNeary for their insights and research assistance. Related
research was funded in part by the Implementation of Multicultural Perspectives and
Approaches in Research and Teaching (IMPART) Awards Program.
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INTRODUCTION
Data brokers collect and sell information about consumers to
companies for marketing and other purposes. This is not a surprise to
most consumers. The media is filled with stories about "Big Data"
and rising concerns with online privacy. What may be surprising to
many, however, is the breadth and depth of data collection and the
secret ways companies use this information to categorize, evaluate,
and essentially discriminate among consumers. 1 Data brokers gather

1.
CALL

FOR

See

EDITH RAMIREZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS:

TRANSPARENCY

AND

ACCOUNTABILITY

i-ix

A

(2014), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparencyaccountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.
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not only consumers' spending and debt histories, but also much more
intimate details of consumers' financial, social, and personal lives.
They track where consumers shop, what they shop for, how they pay
for purchases, and much more. Some data brokers even make
assumptions about consumers based on whether they use a pen or
pencil to fill out forms.2
Data sharing and aggregation also have reached unimaginable
levels. Data brokers share and sell information among themselves
through a complex web of relationships to create individual and
group-based consumer files. These files include a vast array of data
points from online and offline sources. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) found in its 2014 study of the largest data
brokers that one broker had "information on 1.4 billion consumer
transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements," and
another broker "adds three billion new records each month to its
databases." 3 Furthermore, one of the studied brokers "has 3000 data
4
segments for nearly every U.S. consumer."1
Data brokers use this mammoth amount of information to
predict consumer behavior and propensities. They make assumptions
and inferences based on the information collected to classify
consumers into segments for positive and negative marketing
campaigns. For example, brokers have generated marketing lists for
pet stores based on consumers' dog product purchasing histories, in
an effort to help these stores target those who would likely want their
products. 5 However, brokers also have used collected data indicating
low income combined with Latino or African-American descent to
classify consumers into segments under seemingly innocuous labels
such as "Urban Scramble" and "Mobile Mixers," possibly fueling
exploitative marketing to these individuals.6
pdf?utm source=govdelivery; see also Katy Bachman, Consumer Scores Are the
Next Privacy Boogeyman in Washington: Report Details 'Hundreds of Secret
Consumer
Scores,'
ADWEEK
(Apr.
3,
2014,
12:47
PM),

http://www.adweek. con/news/technology/consumer-scores-are-next-privacyboogeyman-washington-156753 (emphasizing the secret nature of these consumer
scores with power to determine our financial futures in today's market).
2.
See Nathalie Martin, Hey Dude, What's Your E-score, CREDIT SLIPS
(Aug. 20, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/08/hey-dude-

whats-your-e-score. html.
3. RAMnIREZ ET
findings).

AL.,

supra note 1, at iv, 46-47 (encapsulating the FTC's

4.

Id. at iv, 47.

5.
6.

See id. at 47.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In addition, some data brokers go beyond consumer
segmentation to create logarithmic consumer "scores" or ratings that
they sell to companies for marketing and other purposes.7 Companies
use these predictive segmentations and scores to assess each
consumer's likely value to the company and to decide what offers
and remedies each consumer deserves in the company's assessment.8
A consumer's score may thus inform how a company will treat that
individual when he or she calls customer service or asks about the
company's products and services. 9
Consumer segmentations and scores therefore have powerful
impacts.1" Companies may use such predictive data devices to
discriminate against consumers they deem less valuable or too risky.
A New York Times reporter observed:
A growing number of companies, including banks, credit and debit card
providers, insurers and online educational institutions are using these
scores to choose whom to woo on the Web. These scores can determine
whether someone is pitched a platinum credit card or a plain one, a fullservice cable plan or none at all. They can determine whether a customer
is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or relegated to an overflow
call center. 11

Despite this power, these scores are largely secret and
impossible to decipher without an in-depth understanding of data
analytics.1" Businesses guard information about consumer scores as

7.

PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, TE SCORING OF AMERICA: How

SECRET CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 6-10
(2014), available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
04/WPFScoringof America April2014 fs.pdf.
8. See id. at 19-20 (discussing the different uses of consumer scores).
9. Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers' Buying Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronlicscores-rank-consumers-by-potential-value .html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
10. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, PersonalizingDefault Rules
and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1440 (2014) ("Big Data can
be used to predict future behavior because the process of studying an individual's
purchases, online searches, borrowing activity, and social network composition
reveals aspects of that individual's personality and preferences.").
11. Singer, supra note 9.
12. See Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The
New World of Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 845, 855-67 (2013). Professor Nathalie Martin
commented that "[the e-score process is entirely nontransparent and obviously not
regulated." Martin, supra note 2.
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proprietary trade secrets.13 They also generally have no legal duty to
comply with credit reporting rules with respect to these ratings and
scores because they are not used for determining credit, insurance, or
employment per se. 14 Instead, companies assert that they use these
predictive valuations and classifications for marketing, which is
merely benign business in our capitalist economy. 15
Use of consumer data also seems fair to the extent that it
rewards consumers for positive purchasing and payment histories,
and funnels offers to consumers to suit their interests. It also may
allow companies to save money by targeting their marketing and
retention efforts. They theoretically can then pass on their cost
savings to consumers through lower prices and higher quality goods
and services. At the same time, companies may seek only the
customers they deem most lucrative. Furthermore, "price
discrimination, in the sense of price differences unsupported by cost
differences," is common.16
Nonetheless, price differentials based on consumer ratings
perpetuate cycles of poverty.17 They augment power imbalances
between the economically and socially powerful "haves" and the
disempowered "have-nots." 18 For example, consumers with more
education and higher income, and those who live in prestigious
neighborhoods, are likely to have more favorable consumer scores or
profiles-and thus obtain better offers, deals, and overall treatment.19
Consumers also may receive special remedies because they have
13. Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An
Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial
Models Scuttled the FinanceMarket, 12 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 87, 117-18 (2011).
14. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (2012) (indicating
the narrow parameters of the Act, which do not extend to general data collection and
reporting for marketing purposes).
15. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 20 ("In new consumer scoring,
some have argued that the scores are mainly just for marketing and are largely
beneficial.").
16. Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (2002).
17. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper:
The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672-76 (1996) (discussing how sellers differentiate among
buyers by providing contract changes and adjustments to only the most sophisticated
consumers who complain).
18. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the
Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279 (2012).
19. See Nate Cullerton, Note, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J.
807, 820-24 (discussing the discriminatory dynamics regarding data collection).
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higher social capital based on their propensity to post on social
media and gather followers and friends online. 2" Meanwhile, less
powerful or socially savvy consumers may miss out on these deals
and perks. 1 Moreover, scores and segmentations that factor in race,
gender, and other suspect considerations may foster discrimination.22
At the same time, lack of transparency regarding consumer
scores and segmentations stymies proper market regulation. It
prevents economists' theoretical "informed minority" from learning
about or notifying others of unfair practices and threatening to go
elsewhere if companies do not make appropriate changes. 3 First,
there is no evidence that a sufficient number of "informed"
consumers know their rights or read privacy policies, especially4
when the terms may not be easily accessible or easy to understand.1
Furthermore, even if some "informed minority" exists, only a
handful of these consumers contest use of their information or seek
better deals. 5 In addition, individuals who receive better deals have
little to no incentive to share information about rationed benefits

20.
21.
22.

See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
See Schmitz, supra note 18, at 296-300.
See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 808 (discussing the heightened potential

of discrimination facilitated by data collection).
23.
See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the
Basis ofImperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
630, 637-39 (1979) ("Thus, if enough searchers exist, firms have incentives both to

compete for their business and to offer the same terms to nonsearchers. When the
preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the preferences of
nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend to protect all
consumers.").
24. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 17, at 664-76 (concluding that the

informed minority argument is based on faulty assumptions); Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to StandardForm Contracts 1-26 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ.

Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 (studying the Internet browsing of 48,154
households and finding that only one or two in 1,000 shoppers studied online
software merchants or accessed their websites). Even proactive shoppers usually
focus on only price and a few other terms particular to their needs. LARRY A.
DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND

29 (2007).
25. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 17, at 647-50 (explaining and
questioning the informed minority argument); Lee Goldman, My Way and the
INTERPRETATION

Highway. The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form

Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 714-16 (1992) (explaining the informed minority
argument through a discussion of the "marginal set of informed consumers").
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with the uninformed masses.26 Businesses then continue to
manipulate contract terms and hide use of consumer data under the
guise of "marketing" and proprietary business practices beyond the
scope of credit reporting rules. 7
Additionally, the lack of personal relations and shared contract
understandings in Business-to-Consumer (B2C) exchanges augment
concerns with consumer scoring and segmentation.28 Companies
often have no basis besides data brokers' predictions to decipher
which consumers they should seek or retain. Scores and segments
based on economic and noneconomic factors create easy rubrics for
discriminating among consumers, while lack of transparency denies
consumers the opportunity to challenge the veracity of these
valuations or alert others to risks associated with these assessments.
Meanwhile, data brokers become more and more sophisticated in
29
uncovering and manipulating consumers' behavioral propensities.
In summary, this creates a strong need for consumer protections that
a broken market has failed to provide.
The FTC highlighted these concerns regarding Big Data's
collection and use of consumer data in its May 2014 report, and has
urged Congress to take action to protect consumers' data privacy.3 °
The FTC and the White House have urged data brokers to provide
consumers with clear notice and increased choice with respect to
collection and use of personal data.31 Some commentators and
policymakers also have proposed that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), which is applicable to data reports used for credit,
insurance, and employment determinations, should be extended to

26. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too
Far, 83 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 879, 895-97 (2008) (discussing how businesses may
discriminate in favor of sophisticated consumers by reducing fees and foregoing
enforcement of terms in their form agreements that are otherwise "prejudicial to
customer interests").
27. See infra notes 89, 98 and accompanying text.
28. Ryan Calo, DigitalMarket Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995,
100344 (2014).
29. See id.
30. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
31. Alexei Alexis, Big Data Report to Obama Urges Reforms on Breach
Notice, ECPA, Consumer Rights, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 5, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/big-data-report-n17179890156/ (urging advancement of the
Obama administration's proposed privacy "bill of rights" and data security breach

notification legislation);

RAMIREZ ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 46-57 (recommending

legislation and policies to increase consumers' access to information about data
collected and to opt out of allowing for use of their data).
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cover consumer scoring more generally.32 However, the FCRA has
not been entirely effective, and it is uncertain whether and how it
should apply to other consumer scores.33
Accordingly, this Article seeks to shed light on consumer
scores and segmentations, and present suggestions for regulating
these data devices with an eye toward maximizing their benefits and
minimizing their drawbacks and dangers. Indeed, the time is ripe for
such regulation, as the FTC is examining the effects of Big Data on
low income and underserved consumers.3 4 Furthermore, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), has voiced concern regarding consumer privacy with respect
to financial products and services.35
Part I of this Article depicts the depth and breadth of data
collection and the use of this data to score and classify consumers for
marketing and other purposes. Part II then discusses the current laws
and regulations that may apply to data collection, as well as rules
restricting data reporting with respect to mainly credit, insurance,
and employment decisions. In light of the current laws' limitations,
Part III considers the FTC's and others' proposals for regulations and
reforms aimed to protect consumers from the dangers of rampant
data collection, scoring, and segmentation. It also highlights the
promise and pitfalls of these proposals and provides suggestions for
balanced reforms that address how such data practices contribute to
the growing gap between consumer "haves" and "have-nots." The
Article concludes by inviting policymakers, businesses, and
consumer groups to consider these and other ideas for imposing just
and cost-effective restrictions on Big Data.

32. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012).
33. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society. Due
Processfor Automated Predictions,89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).
34. FTC to Examine Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved
Consumers at September Workshop, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.ftc. gov/news -events/press -releases/20 14/04/ftc -examine -effects -bigdata-low-income-underserved-consumers
(announcing the September 2014
workshop to explore these issues).
35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; David Cho &
Michael D. Shear, White House Issues Detailed Proposalfor Consumer-Finance
Watchdog, WASH. POST (July 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004187.html.
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I. CONSUMER SCORES AND SEGMENTATIONS IN THE EXPANDING
WORLD OF BIG DATA

Data collection has expanded exponentially with the growth of
the Internet and online contracting, and data brokers have banked on
that growth in selling consumers' information. Furthermore, brokers
have plugged that data into highly technical algorithms to create
consumer classifications and scores or ratings that companies then
use to determine how they will treat consumers in the marketplace.
Such assessments based on collected data and inferences may benefit
companies and consumers when they enhance products and services,
and open doors to positive innovations. However, such expansion of
Big Data has become problematic due to its clandestine nature and
discriminatory effects.36
A. Expanding Data-Broker Industry
Data collection is not new. The United States Census Bureau
has been gathering data since the first census in 1790."7 Since that
time, however, privacy concerns have risen exponentially as not only
the government, but also private companies and data brokers gather
information about consumers from both online and offline sources.38
The news is filled with stories of data breaches and identity theft.
This has created growing angst among consumers in the online
marketplace, with 92% of U.S. Internet users worrying about their
online privacy.
Nonetheless, consumers are not fully aware of the depth and
breadth of data collection and online tracking by private companies
operating outside of the public eye. Only 47% of respondents in that
36.

See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 808. Notably, lack of consumer privacy

protections in the United States also has had significant impacts on national and
economic security. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER
PRIVACY, AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY (2014) (providing written remarks for the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade). This reinforces the need for better
consumer privacy protections in the United States and should hasten policymakers'
efforts in that regard.
37. Agency History,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/istory/
www/census then now/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
38.
See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
39. See TRUSTE, TRUSTE 2014 US CONSUMER CONFIDENCE PRIVACY
REPORT: CONSUMER OPINION AND BUSINESS IMPACT 3 (2014), available at
http://download.truste.com/dload.php/?f=4HKV87KT-447.
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same survey of Internet users said they were concerned with
companies tracking their behavior online. 4' In reality, however, all
consumers have good reason to be very concerned with the expanse
of Big Data and its tracking tirade. As noted above, the FTC found
that data brokers gather information on billions of transactions and
aggregate hundreds of billions of data elements to create consumer
profiles. 41
Search engines like Google, Yahoo, and Bing are notorious for
collecting consumers' data. 4' EBay, Amazon, ESPN, Disney (which
owns ABC), MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are just a
handful of the companies that eagerly collect their patrons' data and
searching habits. 43 Furthermore, companies such as IBM, which were
once associated with computer products and software, have moved
into the data industry, viewing data as "the world's new natural
resource." 44 Consumers should expect that Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), search engines, merchants, and other data brokers are
tracking their every move online.45
This increase in "who" collects data pales in comparison to the
mammoth expansion in "what" data companies collect about
consumers. Data collectors track consumers when they make online
purchases, use store loyalty cards, and pay for goods or services
using their credit and debit cards. 46 They also track spending habits,
how long one lingers on a website, consumers' online searching
histories, family information, and even postings on social sites such
as Facebook. 41 "Consumer data companies are scooping up huge
40. Id. at 3-6. Nonetheless, concerns about tracking have escalated among
those aged 55-64, and is higher among married than single persons. Id. at 7.
41.

See

RAMIREZ ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 46-47.

42. See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 847.
43. Joseph Conlin, The New Media and Marketing Landscape, at *7 (Jan.
29, 2014), https ://web.archive.org/web/20140815012524/http://wwwlbpt.bridgeport
.edu/-jconlin/IntemetMarketing.pdf.
44. IBM, WHAT WIL WE MAKE OF THIS MOMENT? 2013 IBM ANNUAL
13-15 (2013), available at http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/2013/bin/

REPORT

assets/2013 ibm annual.pdf (focusing strategy on transforming IBM's place in Big
Data for prediction and prescription based on collected and aggregated data).
45.

See Online Information Brokers and Your Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS
(Oct. 1, 2004), https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/infobrokers.

CLEARINGHOUSE

htm.
46. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have On Consumers, and How
Do They Use It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th
Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission).
47.

See Conlin, supra note 43.
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amounts of consumer information" and "selling it, providing
marketers details about whether you're pregnant or divorced or
trying to lose weight, about how rich you are and what kinds of cars
you drive. "148
Data brokers also augment information with data from one's
ISP, device-tracking software, facial recognition software, and
programs like Google AdSense in order to build consumer profiles.49
This may include information about consumers' use of particular
browsers, propensity to click on certain ads, phone numbers, email
address, location, IP address, and much more.5" Data brokers also
have become especially vigilant in tracking consumers' third-party
and social connections online. Indeed, data collection and
aggregation transpires through an unimaginable labyrinth of
information sharing among merchants and data brokers.51
"Cookies" may not be so sweet to consumers. Cookies,
embedded in almost all websites, track consumers while navigating a
website, and may follow the consumer's activity to gather further
information as he or she visits other websites 5 These cookies are
usually stealth. However, one can see what bluekai.com, for
example, has gathered from some cookies by visiting
http://www.bluekai.com/registry. 53
Such rare disclosures are
4
for many consumers.5
alarming
equally
but
refreshing,
somewhat
Researchers at the University of California, Berkeley compared
top websites' cookies and other tracking technologies from 2009 to
2011 with tracking technologies in 2013 and found that "the number
48. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know
About You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/

article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
49. Bono, 'Reclaim Your Name:' Find Out What Big Data Companies
Know About You, SKYTECHGEEK (Aug. 2, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/201407
02075145/http://skytechgeek.com/2013/08/big-data-companies-know-about-you/.
50.
Id.; see also, Laura J. Bowman, Note, PullingBack the Curtain: Online
Consumer Tracking, 7 ISJLP 721, 727, 733-36, 748-49 (2012).

51. See generally Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Consumer Legal
Protections Against the Layers of Big Data (unpublished manuscript) (2014 TPRC
Conference Paper), available at http://papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
2418805##.
52. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 29-30 (discussing the use of
cookies).
53.

The Bluekai Registry Putting Consumers in Control of Their Digital

Footprint,ORACLE: BLuEKAi, http://www.bluekai.com/registry/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2015).

54. It caused quite a stir when I had students in one of my classes check
their names on this site.
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of tracking cookies expanded dramatically[,] and... advertisers had
developed new, previously unobserved tracking mechanisms that
users cannot avoid even with the strongest privacy settings."5 5 They
found that 100% of the top websites now use tracking software and
that third-party tracking companies and advertisers, instead of firstparty sites, 56now place most cookies without consumers' approval or
awareness.
Tracking can be quite extensive. For example, Bloomberg
News reporters gained access to every aspect of users' research
information on the Bloomberg Terminal.5 7 The intricacies of the
tracking allowed these reporters to track users' every keystroke.58
One commentator likened this data collection through Bloomberg
Terminal as a modem equivalent of the "memex" 1945 futuristic
concept of a desktop technology that records trails of searches and
other information for later users.5 9 The commentator also argued that
so-called "[d]eidentification" of data as a safeguard for user privacy
is largely ineffective because IP addresses and other identifying
information can easily be reattached to ostensibly anonymous user
data.6 °
While consumers may enjoy the personalized advertisements
they receive due to tracking, they are often alarmed that they are
unable to easily block data tracking.6 1 Many data brokers do not offer
a method for opting out of data sharing.6 2 Moreover, consumers
unknowingly may consent to share data with layers of data collectors
55. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You
Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L & POL'Y REv. 273, 273 (2012). A Wall Street Journal
article found that the "nation's 50 top websites on average installed 64 pieces of
tracking technology onto the computers of visitors, usually with no warning." Julia
Angwin, The Web 's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at
Wl.
56. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 276.
57. See James Grimmelmann, Big Data's Other Privacy Problem 2-3
(Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of Law, Paper No. 7, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358079.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id. at 6.
61. See id. at 2-5.
62. See Erica M. Scott, Note, Protecting Consumer Data While Allowing
the Web to Develop Self-Sustaining Architecture: Is a Trans-Atlantic Browser-Based
Opt-In for Behavioral Tracking the Right Solution?, 1 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L. J. 285, 295-305 (2014); Julia Angwin, Privacy Tools: Opting Out
from
Data Brokers, PROPUBLICA
(Jan.
30,
2014,
1:29
PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/privacy-tools-opting-out-from-data-brokers.
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by failing to opt out of data collection and sharing with one
company. 63 The FTC found that because data brokers are usually not
consumer-facing, it is confusing or nearly impossible for consumers
to opt out of data collection and sharing even when data brokers
ostensibly provide that option.6 4 Furthermore, even the sophisticated
and informed minority of consumers that learn about and access
brokers' websites that do allow for opting out may not realize the
limitations of those opt-outs or that doing so with one company will
not protect against other companies' data mining."
Consumers also are slow to block cookies when searching the
web because companies often state that site features are not available
without cookies enabled.66 Advertisers have agreed "in principle to a
universal 'Do Not Track' mechanism," but that does not preclude
third parties including Google, Facebook, and others from continuing
to gather data via cookies and other tracking mechanisms.67 In
addition, removed information "may be re-posted ... at a later date
when [a] company downloads a new batch of information."68 Robust
tracking mechanisms such as "Flash cookies" also gather
increasingly more information and can reinstate themselves after
being deleted.69
Furthermore, data collectors and merchants benefit by offering
"free" online services.7" The problem is that "free" is not truly free.71
For example, some websites provide consumers with "free" rate
calculators and other online tools to gather quotes and information
63.
64.

Bagley & Brown, supra note 51, at 33-40.
RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.

65. Id. at 49, 53 (noting that many data brokers do not provide consumers
with access to their data with respect to risk mitigation products offered to help
companies verify identity).
66. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 290 (discussing how Hulu
requires users to accept cookies to access certain services).
67.

Id. at 275-76.

68.

Online Information Brokers and Your Privacy, supra note 45 (stating

further tips and information regarding data broker issues).
69. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 282. Similarly, technologies that
write files to users' computers (Etags, Flash cookies, HTML5 local storage, and
Evercookies) are also difficult to block and delete because they can reinstate
themselves. Id. at 281-85. There are also technologies that rely on attributes of
users' computers (i.e., using an aggregate of features such as browser type, plug-ins,
and font) as a "fingerprint" to remotely track users' Internet usage based on what
their computers do. Id.
70. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accountingfor the Costs
of the Internet's Most PopularPrice, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608 (2014).

71.

Id. at 609.
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for products such as mortgages, college loans, or insurance.72 These
fill-in-the-form search widgets assist consumers in their budgeting
and in obtaining services ranging from finding home contractors to
choosing car insurance and applying for online degrees.73 Consumers
seeking the information and assistance willingly divulge vast
amounts of personal, financial, and even health information. Data
brokers then use and sell this information gathered through these
widgets. 4
Data brokers also collect and share data from location-tracking
services. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied incar location services at the end of 2013 in an effort to understand the
breadth and depth of the data issues associated with these services.75
It asked ten companies that offer these location-based services
regarding their use of collected data and associated policies.76 It
found that all of these companies collect location data, and nine of
the ten share that data with third parties for the purpose of providing
services to consumers.77 Nonetheless, all of the companies said that
they do not share or sell personally identifiable information or
location data with data brokers, and they aim to comply with best
practices such as disclosing their use of data to their customers. 78
However, the GAO also found that the companies' disclosures were
often misleading, did not give consumers power to delete or
safeguard their data, and failed to provide information on how the
companies hold themselves and their employees accountable."
Again, consumers may enjoy the benefits of widgets and the
personalized advertisements that companies generate based on
gathered information. However, data aggregation and sharing is deep
and vast. This data includes information from various public records,
online tracking, and monitoring in the physical world. Real estate,
criminal, bankruptcy, and any other public records are all fair game
for data collectors. Consumers' age, address, family data, ethnicity,

72.
73.
74.
75.

Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 856.
Id.
Hooffnagle & Whittington, supra note 70, at 633.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-81, IN-CAR

LOCATIONBASED SERVICES: COMPANIES ARE TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY, BUT SOME
RISKS
MAY
NOT
BE
CLEAR
TO
CONSUMERS
(2013), available at

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 14-81.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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employment, and medical information also are easily accessible.8"
Data brokers also gather information through consumers' use of store
loyalty cards and coupons, as well as entries to seemingly benign
contests and raffles.81 One company even adds its assumption that
those who fill out forms using a pen instead of a pencil are more
likely to pay their bills on time.82 Moreover, downstream data
aggregation makes it nearly impossible for consumers to determine
where or how a particular company has obtained their data.83
Accordingly, data brokers' business model is essentially to
gather as much information as possible and sell it to the highest
bidders.8 4 They use this data to create consumer profiles that inform
how companies treat consumers in the marketplace.85 Consumers are
nonetheless unaware of this data collection and unable to verify the
data's accuracy.86 Inaccurate data and assumptions may then lead
companies to offer consumers less or more advantageous deals than
warranted.87 Moreover, algorithmic determinations may incorporate
discriminatory assumptions and perpetuate problematic stereotypes
that hinder consumers seeking to overcome social and economic
barriers.88

B. Secret Scoring and Segmentations of Consumers' Value
Boundaries have blurred between data collection and consumer
scoring or valuation. Data brokers profit by selling leads and using
80. See Spokeo to Pay $800, 000 to Settle FTC Charges CompanyAllegedly
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION
(June 12, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-

releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedlymarketed.
81.
See What Information Do DataBrokers Have On Consumers, and How
Do They Use It, supra note 46, at 9.

82. Martin, supra note 2 (stating that a founder of a leading e-score
company "learned working at Fingerhut how to sniff out a good paying customer,
concluding... that people who filled out forms in pen were better payers than those
who used pencils and people who used a middle initial paid more often that [sic]
those who did not").
83. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C, C-7 (providing statements of
Commissioner Julie Brill).
84.
85.
86.
87.

Angwin, supra note 55, at W1.
Id.
See id.
See id.; Howard Baldwin, Big Data's Big Impact Across Industries,

(Mar. 28, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardbaldwin/
2014/03/28/big-datas-big-impact-across-industries/.
FORBES

88.

See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 820-24.
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gathered data to differentiate among consumers. For example,
Bankrate.com gathers data and generates leads that it sells to
companies to enhance their marketing strategies.89 Bankrate hosts a
consumer-friendly website with rate calculators and other tools that
prompt individuals to provide a wide array of personal and financial
information in order to obtain loan- and insurance-rate quotes. 90 As
noted above, such ostensibly "free" widgets can assist consumers in
creating budgets and planning finances. As Bankrate.com boasts on
its site, it is "the Web's leading aggregator of financial rate
information" and "provides free rate information to consumers on
more than 300 financial products" with the help of its staff of
reporters and experts. 91 It also notes that it works with a network and
co-branded sites to "provide the tools and information via a suite of
products and services that can help consumers make better informed
financial decisions. 9 2
Despite the consumer-friendly nature of Bankrate.com, the site
does not make it clear to consumers that it profits from collecting
website visitors' personal contact information, device details, ISP
data, and location. 93 Although Bankrate's privacy policy reveals that
the company may transmit data collected about consumers to third
parties, it does not explain that it also may sell the data for fees
ranging from $8 for an insurance prospect and $35 for a finance lead
to $75 for a mortgage prospect. 94 Researchers found that in 2011, for
example, Bankrate.com sold 18 million leads to 20,000 agents and
75 carriers at considerable profits.95 Bankrate.com also works with
major, but little known, online scoring companies TARGUSinfo and
eBureau to determine more precisely what it predicts as consumers'
value to particular businesses. 96
Bankrate.com is not alone in profiting from data collection and
lead generation. Experian, for example, has branched well beyond
89.

Singer,

supra note

9;

see

also About

Bankrate, BANKRATE,

http://www.bankrate.com/coinfo/default.asp (highlighting that the site seeks to
benefit consumers and not discussing the lead generation aspects beyond mention of
"partners") (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
90.
91.
92.
93.

About Bankrate,supra note 89.
Id.
Id.
PrivacyPolicy, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/coinfo/privacy.

asp (last updated Sept. 17, 2014).
94. Singer, supra note 9; see also Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at
852 n.26.

95.

Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 857.

96.

Id.
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traditional credit reporting to sell leads.97 Experian even sells lists of
expectant parents and families with babies, who companies then
target for marketing certain products.98 Similarly, these data brokers
may aggregate consumers' information from various sources and
plug a wide variety of information into data-driven calculations and
predictive models.99 These decisional models theoretically seek to
account for a holistic view of each customer in crafting scores and/or
ratings that companies use to differentiate among consumers. 100
Consumer scoring therefore takes data collection and lead
generation to the next level by using complicated mathematics,
statistical modeling, and algorithms to crystallize many factors into
numbers companies may use for marketing, predicting future
behavior, assessing risks, and essentially determining how they treat
different consumers.1 °1 Consumer scoring companies employ
actuaries and math wizards to essentially boil down a vast amount of
data into scores or ratings that aim to predict an individual
consumer's likely value as a customer.102 These formulas and
equations nonetheless remain a mystery to consumers because they
are generally considered proprietary and shielded by trade secret

law. 103
EBureau is a leader in the consumer scoring industry. 104 This
company markets "eScores" as "a service that enables rapid
development and deployment of customized statistical scores" that
enable companies to optimize marketing, accounts receivable
management, and other important interactions with consumers.105 It
bases its scores on a "massive data warehouse" that includes
consumer credit data, real property and asset records, household
demographics, various files containing name, address, telephone and
97.
98.
99.

Beckett, supra note 48.

See id.
Bagley & Brown, supra note 51, at 6.

100.

DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 8.

101.
102.

Id. at 6-10.
Id. at 27-28.

103.

Reddix-Smalls, supra note 13, at 117-18. It is impossible for consumers

to learn about or understand exactly what goes into their credit scores or whether
they are statistically correct due to complicated algorithms. Id. Moreover, not even
the govermnent is able to pierce trade secrets law to test the algorithms' accuracy or
validity. Id.
104.
2015).
105.

About eBureau, EBUREAU, http://www.ebureau.com (last visited Jan. 7,
EBUREAU,

ESCORES

DATA

SHEET,

available

http://www.ebureau.com/sites/all/files/file/datasheets/ebureau-escore-datasheet.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
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date of birth information, Internet and other purchase histories,
bankruptcy filings, and other public documents.1 6 It also may
include behavioral assumptions in the mix of factors contributing to
eScores.
EBureau's algorithms remain secret, but it does reveal that it
adds several thousand details from its data warehouse to the data sets
that clients submit from their current marketing lists.107 EBureau then
extrapolates common factors among these existing customer bases
and uses that data to create complicated algorithms to determine
prospective consumer eScores.10 8 These scores range from zero to
ninety-nine, with ninety-nine indicating the best and zero indicating
the worst likely return on a company's investment.1 9 EBureau
highlights low scores as especially important in culling would-be
customers. 1 0 In online education, for instance, schools use scores to
winnow prospective students as not worth the investment of course
catalogs or follow-up calls.1 1
In addition to eScores, eBureau also offers the following:
eTarget Demographics, a real-time consumer demographic data append
service that helps B2C online marketers to instantly gain a comprehensive
perspective of their opt-in Website visitor; Income Estimator, a modeldriven information append service that helps consumer-facing companies
to estimate a person's income; and eLink, a service that helps accounts
receivable management firms and
departments locate, update, and append
11 2
information to a debtor record.

Essentially, eBureau not only gathers data, but also adds information
from various sources to consumers' files and makes predictions that
companies use in a wide variety of ways.
Data brokers like eBureau may provide companies with
efficient marketing and workflow devices by helping them to best
allocate marketing resources. However, the data and assumptions at
the foundation of consumer scores may not be accurate. The FTC
found in its study that although data brokers usually take some steps
to check accuracy of data collected, data quality varies greatly

106.

Id.

107. Singer, supra note 9.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Company Overview of eBureau, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSNESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=2
7128128 (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
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among data brokers and products.113 Competition in the data industry
pushes brokers to improve accuracy, but errors nonetheless persist
due to data gap-filling and downstream aggregation. 114 It is like the
child's game of "telephone" in which the first child whispers a secret
in the ear of the nearest player and the players seek to repeat the
secret ear-to-ear until the last player must reveal what she heardwhich has usually changed significantly by the time it has reached
115
the last child's ears.
Furthermore, the lack of transparency and inability to contest
collected data and related assumptions are concerning. Consumers
may be upset to learn that a company offers them different deals and
levels of care based on predictive scores. Neustar, for example,
instantly scores consumers when they call a client company's
customer service center to alert agents what to offer that caller.116 As
another example, Wayfair.com may offer consumers different deals
based on whether its algorithms classify the consumers as "hunters"
or "gatherers" when searching this online-sellers' website.117
Consumer scoring is rampant and increasingly nuanced as
individuals become subject to dozens or hundreds of secret consumer
scores.118 The following are among the long list of scores highlighted
by a recent report of the World Privacy Forum (WPF-a non-profit
public interest research and consumer education group):
" Experian's ChoiceScore for financial risk;
" Experian's Median Equivalency Score for seriously
derogatory behavior;
113.
114.

RAMIREZETAL.,supranote 1, at 36-38.
Id.

115. This was a common party game when I was a child (long before video
games and iPads!). It was always surprising how the secret changed when whispered
from ear-to-ear despite each child's earnest attempt to simply repeat the secret.
Gossip is very similar in the sense that information changes the further it gets from
the original source.
116.

Neustar PlatformOne, NEUSTAR,

http://www.neustar.biz/marketing-

solutions (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
117.
Abram Brown, How Wayfair Sells Nearly $1 Billion Worth of Sofas,
Patio Chairs and Cat Playgrounds, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014, 6:00 AM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/20 14/04/16/how-wayfair-sells-nearly-1 billion-worth-of-sofas-patio-chairs-and-cat-playgrounds/print/ (emphasizing how the
company has flourished using its algorithms and tracking consumers' buying
habits). "Hunters" are customers who indicate a propensity to search for and buy a
particular item after price comparisons; such customers receive special deals as a
means to capture their business while "gatherers," who indicate a willingness to
"window-shop," do not receive these deals. Id.
118.

See generally DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7.
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"
"
"

Consumer Profitability Score to target profitable households;
Job Security Score;
Acxiom's Consumer Prominence Indicator Score for a
consumer's market activity;
" Equifax's Discretionary Spending Index Score;
" Experian's Veriscore for customer value potential;
" Chum Score to predict when a customer will move business
to another merchant;
" Target's Pregnancy Predictor Score;
" Klout Score using social media to track one's number of
Followers;
" Employment Success Score predicting job success using
Facebook data;
" Casino Gaming Propensity Score;
" Economic Stability Indicator.119
The WPF report also explains how some of these scores go
beyond assessments based on an individual's financial information to
include consideration of that individual's connections, networks, and
"friends" on social media.12 Advertisers may reach out to a highly
valued customer's "friends" on Facebook to market goods and
services presuming that the consumer's friends will share
characteristics they deem valuable for their business.121 However, a
company also may downgrade a consumer's value based on
"friends" and connections deemed less worthy in the company's
valuation."' "Social credit" also considers consumers' influence on
social media more generally, including followers on Twitter and
friends on Facebook.1 3 Consumers may even be judged based on the
music they listen to on Spotify and Pandora.
The FTC also released a 2014 report describing how data
brokers use complex models and algorithms to segment and score

119. Id. at 42-79 (discussing all the different types of scores and including
scoring well beyond what is noted here).
120. Id. at 72-76.
121. See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 814-17 (discussing valuations based on
social media connections).
122. See id. at 816.
123. Id. at 816-17.
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consumers.124 The FTC based its report on information the
Commission gathered from nine of the largest data brokers in the
United States.1 5 These brokers covered a cross section of the
industry ranging from those that focus on products for marketing to
those specializing in risk mitigation and people searches.1"6
Specifically, the FTC gathered details about the following: "The
nature and sources of consumer information [the data brokers]
collect. How the companies use, maintain, and distribute that
information. If they allow consumers to see the information they
collect, if consumers can correct inaccuracies or opt out of having
their information sold."127 In conducting its study, the FTC voiced its
concerns for data privacy while also acknowledging how data
collection and sharing benefit consumers and the economy by
helping address fraud and allowing companies to better market their
goods and services. 128

124. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 19-39 (discussing these marketing
products and the many categorizations companies use in determining consumer
offers and treatment). The FTC gathered information by sending out Model Orders
requiring the selected data brokers to produce information regarding the companies'
products and services, general data collection practice, complaint and inquiry record,
policies regarding consumer access to the collected data, and a list of the company's
largest consumers. Id. at app. A. The orders also asked the brokers to provide a
Special Report detailing a variety of information, including the nature and purpose
of products and services that use personal data, methods of accuracy evaluation,
transparency, consumer access to collected data, and consumers' ability to correct or
delete information collected. Id.
125. Janna Herron, FTC Takes on Data Brokers, BANKRATE (Dec. 19, 2012,
4:00 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20 13 1003065653/http://www.bankrate.com/
financing/credit-cards/ftc-takes-on-data-brokers/; see RAMIEZ ET AL., supra note 1,
at 9-10.
126.

See RAMIREZ ET AL,supra note 1, at i.

127.

Id.; see FTC to Study Data Broker Industry's Collection and Use of

Consumer Data, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news

-events/press-releases/2012/12/fic-study-data-broker-industrys-collection-useconsumer-data; see also, e.g., Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade
Comm'n Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., to 4Nannies 2 (May 2, 2013), availableat
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-warns-databroker-operations-possible-privacy-violations/130507databrokers4nanniesletter.pdf
("At this time, we have not evaluated your company's practices to determine
whether they comply with the FCRA. However, we encourage you to review your
products and services, as well as your policies, employee-training, and other
procedures for compliance.").
128. FTC to Study Data Broker Industry's Collection and Use of Consumer
Data, supra note 127.
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In May 2014, the FTC issued its report based on the
information collected. 129 It highlighted some benign classifications
such as "Consumers Interested in Buying Camping Gear," but also
revealed questionable segments based on combinations of age,
ethnicity, and/or income such as: "Urban Scramble" and "Mobile
Mixers" ("high concentration of Latino and African-American
consumers with low incomes"), "Thrifty Elders" (singles in late
60s/early 70s with low income), "Work & Causes" (lower-income
consumers in late 40s/early 50s in multi-unit dwellings), "Timeless
Traditions" (immigrants, many of retirement age with limited
English and lower incomes), "Downtown Dwellers" (lower-income
singles in metro areas with limited education and working clerical or
service jobs to "make[] ends meet"), and "Metro Parents" (single
parents with limited education, living "urban life on a small
budget").13 ° Classifications also may take into account health
conditions such as diabetes and high cholesterol, only to name a

few. 131
The FTC also found that five of the nine brokers it studied
provide analytic products "based on algorithms that consider
hundreds or thousands of data elements," and may be converted into
a variety of scores for consumers. 132 Scores may assess consumers'
likely response or purchase rates, influence and presence on the
Internet, and purchasing power more generally. 133 For example,
companies use "social influence scores to ensure that they advertise
their products to these particular consumers, with the expectation
that these consumers will, in turn, tout these products to their friends
134
and followers.
Such scoring and "social influence" assessments raise serious
relational concerns by judging individuals based on their connections
135
and essentially who they "hang out with" on social media.
Furthermore, consumer scoring more generally has raised red flags
for many government regulators and consumer advocates. Professor
Frank Pasquale has studied the broker industry and highlighted how

129. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at i-ii.
130. Id. at 19-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also listing more
segments).
131.
132.

Id. at47.
Id. at31.

133.
134.
135.

Id. at iii.
Id. at31.
Cullerton, supra note 19, at 825-26.
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these consumer scores perpetuate discriminatory contracting.136 He

stated with respect to e-scores .'I'm troubled by the idea that some
people will essentially be seeing ads for subprime loans, vocational
schools and payday loans . . .while others might be seeing ads for

137
regular banks and colleges, and not know why.'
Mierzwinksi and Chester also have questioned whether these
scores cross over the line from valid marketing or permissible data
collection to credit reporting and assessment governed by the
FCRA. 138 Currently, the FCRA does not generally apply to broader
consumer scores or ratings because it only applies to credit scores or
139
reports used for credit, employment, or insurance determinations.
Similarly, consumer scores usually fall outside the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), which bars consideration of factors like
race, gender, and marital status in extending credit.140 Those creating
consumer scores also are generally not obligated to follow Fair
141
Information Practices or provide due process to consumers.
Concerns regarding this lack of regulation and transparency have
spurred the FTC and the CFPB to study related Issues.142

II.

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON DATA BROKERS AND CREDIT SCORING

The law governing privacy and the data broker industry is far
from clear. As the GAO has stated, "In relation to data used for
marketing purposes, no federal statute provides consumers the right
to learn what information is held about them and who holds it."14
This Section therefore aims only to provide a brief sketch of the key
regulations and potential restrictions on data brokers' use of
consumer information to create scores or valuations. Namely, the
FTC regulates data privacy, and its chief enforcement tool is the
FCRA governing credit reporting that impacts consumers' access to

136.
137.

Singer, supra note 9.
Id. (quoting Frank Pasquale).

138.

Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 861-62.
DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 44.
Id. at 9-10.

139.
140.

141. Id. at 10 (summarizing problems associated with consumer scoring).
142. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 878-81 (calling for these
agencies to study these issues and establish clear policy in light of the growing
digital marketplace).
143.
RESELLERS:

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
CONSUMER PRIVACY

OFFICE, GAO-13-663,

FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT

TECHNOLOGY AND THE MARKETPLACE 16 (2013).

INFORMATION
CHANGES IN
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credit, insurance, and employment. 144 Nonetheless, this Act generally
does not govern broad-based consumer scoring and ratings
companies use for marketing and other consumer interactions. 145 This
leaves the area ripe for regulation by the FTC and/or CFPB.
A. FTC and the FCRA
The FCRA generally governs consumer reports and imposes
duties upon consumer reporting agencies. 146 The Act requires these
agencies to provide consumers with all information in their credit
files upon request, including information about payment histories
and the identities of all those who received the reports. 147 Consumers
have a right to one free copy of their report from each reporting
agency per year. 148 They also may have a right to more than one free
copy per year in some states. 149 Furthermore, consumers may obtain
a free copy of their credit file in various circumstances such as
identity theft or when "[a] person has taken adverse action against
you because of information in your credit file.""15 Upon consumer
request, reporting agencies also must provide consumers with "[t]he
dates, original payees, and amounts of any checks [written by the
consumers] upon which [the agency] based any adverse
characterization of the consumer[s]" in their reports.151
In addition, reporting agencies must supplement reports with a
statement setting forth consumers' FCRA rights.15 This statement
notifies consumers that the reporting agencies must correct or delete
inaccurate, incomplete, or unverifiable information generally within
thirty days after one notifies the agency of the discrepancy.153
Consumers bear the burden, however, to do their due diligence in
obtaining their credit reports, checking them for accuracy, and
notifying the agency reporting the inaccurate information in writing

144. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
145. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 860.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(b).
147. Id.§ 1681g(a).
148. Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A).
149. See A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT,
available at http://www.cheyney.edu/human-resources/documents/1-12013 Summaryof Rights.pdf (last visited Jan. 7,2015).
150. Id.
151.
15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(4).
152. 16 C.F.R. § 601.1(b) (2001).
153. Id.§ 601 app.A.
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of any discrepancies. 154 The FCRA does not require agencies to give
consumers their scores free of charge, but they must disclose all the
information in credit files. 155 Furthermore, agencies have no duty to
remove accurate information unless it is more than seven years old,
156
or ten years old in the case of bankruptcies.
Notably, these rules only apply to consumer reports as defined
by the FCRA. 157 Section 168la(d)(1)
consumer report as:

of the FCRA defines a

[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or
collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 168 lb of this title. 158

Under this definition, the FCRA generally applies to the
traditional credit reports that most consumers have heard of or seen
from companies like Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax. 159 It also
applies to reports created by lesser-known reporting agencies.160 One
such powerful agency that remains largely unknown is Advanced
Resolution Services, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Visa, Inc. that
assists in evaluating risks related to credit cardholders' accounts.161
154. One may go online to www.ftc.gov to obtain information on getting
their annual free credit reports (one from each of the three main agenciesExperian, Equifax, and Transunion). Get My Free Credit Report, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc. gov/faq/consumer-protection/get-my-free-credit-report
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015). Consumers also may call 1-877-FTC-HELP to file a
complaint or to obtain free information about consumer issues. About Us, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION,

http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 7,

2015).
155.
15 U.S.C. § 1681j(f)(1).
156. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 605(a), 84 Stat. 1128,
1129-30 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
158. Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
159. Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 846.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
161. See Company Overview of Advanced Resolution Services, Inc.,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.con/research/stocks/
private/snapshot.asp?privcapld=108558215 (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). There is not a
great deal of information on ARS available on the Internet or elsewhere. I learned
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The FCRA generally does not apply to internal credit
determinations that a company may make based on data it has
collected from its own tracking or from parties other than credit
reporting agencies. 162 The Act also does not apply to data brokers
who compile information for marketing purposes or to determine
general consumer treatment.163 These companies postulate that their
data collection is outside the purview of the FCRA because they do
not necessarily collect data or issue scores in connection with
lending, insurance, or employment decisions. 16 4 Nonetheless, these
companies collect information about consumers' "credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, [and] mode of living."165
That said, the FTC has been investigating privacy issues and
data collection in broader contexts beyond traditional credit
reporting. The FTC has authority to regulate data privacy and is
166
appropriately concerned with the expansion of data collection.
Section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 167 The FTC therefore aims to increase transparency in
the marketplace in order to protect consumers from deception. 168 It
also targets deceptive practices that place consumers' privacy at risk
with respect to not only financial information under the FCRA, but
169
also to health information and data regarding children.

about ARS when it sent me notice of suspected fraudulent use of my credit card.
After providing proof of identity, ARS sent me their "Consumer Report" on me
along with statements alerting me of my rights. Letters from ARS to author (letters
on file with author).
162.
163.
164.

See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 846.
See id.at 860.
See id. at 858-60.

165.
166.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
See Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 877.

167.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).

168.

Id. § 45(a)(2); see also Mierzwinski & Chester, supra note 12, at 876-

77.
169. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 131-33, 113 Stat.
1338, 1382-83 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.);
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, § 1306, 112

Stat. 2681-728, 2681-734 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6505); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.

1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.);
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations

1437

[T]he FTC conducts its investigations with a focus on reasonableness-a
company's data security measures must be reasonable in light of the
sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and
complexity of its data operations, and the cost of available tools to
improve security and reduce vulnerabilities. 170

In this vein, the FTC has been investigating online privacy
issues and dangers associated with companies' collection and use of
consumers' data generally without knowledge or approval. 171 In
March 2012, the FTC issued a report setting forth best practices for
companies to follow in order to better protect consumers' privacy
and give them greater control over the collection and use of their
personal data. 172 The lengthy report shed light on companies'
collection of consumers' information from not only direct
interaction, but also public records and information purchased from
other companies without consumers' consent. 173 The FTC noted that
most consumers do not realize which companies have their data or
what information the companies have, and it is very difficult for
consumers to access and to verify collected data, even when data
brokers offer that option. 174 It is tough for even the savviest
consumers to investigate the winding and uncertain trails of data
sources. 175
The FTC report concluded that there is a lack of laws requiring
data brokers to maintain the privacy of consumer data that falls
outside of the FCRA's scope. 176 It therefore recommended that
Congress consider enacting legislation requiring all data brokers to
protect privacy and ensure data security and breach notification for

170.
ProtectingConsumer Information: Can Data Breaches Be Prevented?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of Edith Ramirez,

Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission).
171.
FTC Issues Final Commission Report on ProtectingConsumer Privacy:
Agency Calls on Companies to Adopt Best Privacy Practices, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION
(Mar.
26,
2012)
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-

releases/20 12/03/ftc-issues-final-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy.
172.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF

(2012),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradeRAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS

conmiission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

26, 68-69.
68-69.
5-43.
68-70.
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consumers.177 The FTC emphasized that brokers should disclose
details about their data collection and use of consumers' information,
provide access to collected data, and give consumers choice
regarding data practices that are inconsistent with the context of a
particular transaction or the business relationship with the
consumer.178 The FTC further suggested that data brokers should
establish a centralized website where consumers could get
information about brokers' practices and consumer options for
controlling data use.179 The Commission nonetheless commended the
progress that had been made regarding Do Not Track, although its
use is limited.180
In the summer of 2012, the FTC also pursued enforcement
actions regarding data privacy. For example, the FTC fined Spokeo
$800,000 for marketing a service that provides consumer reports and
background checks.181 This was the first time the FTC initiated an
enforcement action related to "the sale of Internet and social media
data in the employment screening context." 18 2 According to the FTC,
Spokeo gathered consumers' personal information from hundreds of
online and offline data sources to create and sell consumer profiles
that included information such as name, address, age range, email
addresses, "hobbies, ethnicity, religion, participation on social
networking

'
sites, and photos."183
Spokeo nonetheless was not

protecting the information or taking steps to assure its accuracy as
required under the FCRA. 18 4 This amounted to unfair and deceptive
acts in commerce.185
In spring of 2013, the FTC issued orders to ten companies after
conducting a test-shopper operation that indicated that these
177. Id. at 1-37 (but concluding that such legislation should not apply to
companies that collect only non-sensitive data from fewer than 5,000 consumers a
year).
178. Id. at 22-70. The report is very lengthy and contains a broad range of
principles for protecting consumers' privacy and access to data collected about
them. Id.
179. Id. at 69.
180. Id. at 52-53. The FTC also is working with the Department of
Commerce and stakeholders to develop industry-specific codes of conduct. Id. at 73.
181. Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA, supra
note 80.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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companies might be violating the FCRA.1 8 6 As "part of a worldwide
privacy protection effort," FTC test-shoppers posed as parties
seeking consumer information to make insurance, credit, or
employment decisions.1 8 7 The letters were not official notice by the
Commission that any of the named companies violated the FCRA,
but they alerted companies to evaluate their practices to determine
whether they are consumer reporting agencies, and if so, to comply
with that law.188
The FTC conducted this operation in conj unction with Global
Privacy
Enforcement
Network, which
"connects
privacy
enforcement authorities to promote and support cooperation in cross'
border enforcement of laws protecting privacy."189
Specifically, the
ten companies flagged for potential violations included:
Two companies that appeared to offer "pre-screened" lists of consumers
for use in making firm offers of credit: ConsumerBase and
ResponseMakers;
Two companies that appeared to offer consumer information for use in
making insurance decisions: Brokers Data and US Data Corporation; and
Six companies that appeared to offer consumer information for
employment purposes: Crimcheck.com, 4Nannies, U.S. Information
Search, People Search Now, Case Breakers, and USA People Search. 190
These companies raised red flags by indicating willingness to sell
consumer information without abiding by FCRA requirements such
as verifying that the potential purchasers of the information planned
to use the data for legitimate purposes.1 91
Since that time, the FTC has brought more enforcement actions
against privacy violators.1 92 For example, the FTC obtained $3.5
million, the second-largest penalty in a FCRA matter, against

186. FTC Warns Data Broker Operations of Possible Privacy Violations,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 7, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-

releases/2013 /05/ftc -warns-data-broker-operations -po ssible-privacy -violations.
187. Id.
188. See Letter from Maneesha Mithal to 4Nannies, supra note 127, at 1.
189. See FTC Warns DataBroker Operationsof PossiblePrivacy Violations,
supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15U.S.C. § 168le(e)(2)(2012).
192. See, e.g., HTC America, Inc., No. C-4406, FTC File No. 122-3049
(June 25, 2013); Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27,
2012); Google, Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011); Twitter,
Inc., No. C-4316, FTC File No. 092-3093 (Mar. 2, 2011).
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Certegy Check Services in August 2013.193 Certegy is one of the
nation's largest check-cashing-authorization services that compiles
people's personal information and uses it to help retailers decide
whether to accept a customer's personal check. 19 4 The company
allegedly failed to follow proper dispute procedures.195 It also failed
to institute reasonable procedures for assuring the accuracy of
information provided to its merchant clients, which included grocery
stores and other common places where consumers would often suffer
great detriment from having their checks denied. 196 The FTC settled a
factually similar lawsuit against TeleCheck for $3.5 million in
January 2014.197
The FTC and its Commissioner have continued to voice
significant concerns regarding Big Data. Commissioner Julie Brill
stated in her address, Big Data and Consumer Privacy: Identifying
Challenges, Finding Solutions, at the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs at Princeton University on February
20, 2014:
As we further examine the privacy implications of big data analytics, I
believe one of the most troubling practices that we need to address is the
collection and use of data-whether generated online or offline-to make
sensitive predictions about consumers, such as those involving their sexual
orientation, health conditions, financial condition, and race. 198

Commissioner Brill went further to highlight companies'
discriminatory use of data to segment consumers deemed risky or
lower value,1 99 making them vulnerable to targeted offers for payday

and other high-cost fringe lending products."'o
193. Certegy Check Services to Pay $3.5 Million for Alleged Violations of
the Fair CreditReportingAct and FurnisherRule, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug.
15, 2013) http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/certegy-checkservices-pay-35 -million-alleged-violations -fair.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. TeleCheck to Pay $3.5 Millionfor FairCreditReportingAct Violations,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressrelease s/20 14/0 1/telecheck-pay-3 5-million-fair-credit-reporting-act-violations.
198. Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Big Data and Consumer
Privacy: Identifying Challenges, Finding Solutions, Address at the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University 3 (Feb. 20, 2014),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/202151/
140220princetonbigdata 0.pdf.
199. See id. at 3-5 (noting alarming facts regarding categorizations).
200. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering
Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 65 (2013).
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Accordingly, the FTC's statements and recent enforcement
actions have been influential in shaping companies' data privacy and
security practices." °1 This essentially has developed a "common law"
for data practices." °' FTC actions and settlements have a ripple effect,
as they provide standards and best practices for brokers to follow and
arouse companies' fear that they will face expensive audits if they
breach these standards. 2°3
Furthermore, the FTC has an opportunity to play a special role
in protecting the consumer "have-nots." It may use its powers to curb
unfair practices that seek to take advantage of vulnerable
consumers. 20 4 It has become clear that data privacy abuses and
improprieties persist, and there is need for legislation or expanded
regulations to curb data brokers' improper practices that evade the
FCRA. Furthermore, the FTC should work in tandem with the CFPB
in regulating data privacy with respect to financial products and
services.

B. CFPB
The CFPB created under Dodd-Frank has the power to restrict
"unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts" that are "likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which [are] not reasonably avoidable
by consumers" where this injury "is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. ' 2°5 DoddFrank defines "abusive" to include contextual consideration of race,
201.

See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New

Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM L. REV. 583, 585 (2014).

202. See generally id. (arguing that the FTC's enforcement actions and
settlements have created a "common law" for privacy regulation, but urging the FTC
to be bolder in its actions).
203. Id. at 600-56; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
Privacy and Security Dutiesfor the Cloud, 13 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 577, at 1-4 (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract id=2424998 (discussing the influences of FTC actions on data practices and
cases indicating that companies may be held responsible for hiring data service
providers that do not follow proper privacy and security standards).
204. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 203, at 3-4.
205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005-06 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531

(2012)). Dodd-Frank includes payday lending within its references to small-dollar
lending, and has expressed its concern with payday lending. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS: A WHITE PAPER OF
INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 1, 4 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201304_cfpbpayday-dap-whitepaper.pdf.
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gender, and other such classifications." 6 Dodd-Frank also directs the
CFPB to research 'access to fair and affordable credit for
traditionally underserved communities"' as well as effective
disclosures to address consumer propensities." °7 This has opened the
door to the CFPB's possible action in the area of consumer reporting
and scoring.
Dodd-Frank also allows for double-barrel federal/state
regulation. The Act mandates that the CFPB must coordinate with
states in regulating financial products and services, and preserve
states' power to provide greater protections than those federal law
provides." 8 This furthers federalism by preserving states' power to
enforce their own consumer protection laws for the benefit of their
citizens." °9 Dodd-Frank also empowers state attorneys general to
enforce the Act's prohibitions and any rules the CFPB
promulgates.21 A broad reading of Dodd-Frank also gives state
attorneys general the power to investigate potential federal
violations.211
Although the FTC has remained at the helm in regulating credit
reporting, the CFPB also has been looking at how its regulations
could extend to consumer reporting on broader levels.212 The CFPB
may exercise its supervisory power "by requiring the submission of
reports and conducting examinations to: (1) Assess compliance with
Federal consumer financial law; (2) obtain information about such
persons' activities and compliance systems or procedures; and (3)
detect and assess risks to consumers and to consumer financial
markets. 21 3 The CFPB may therefore review the processes used by
credit reporting companies in compiling their reports and ensure that
companies comply with requirements of the FCRA. 14 Nonetheless,
"because the rule itself does not require any entity to alter its
206.
See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of
Attorneys GeneralAfter Dodd Frank, 99 IOWA L. REv. 115, 132-54 (2013) (noting

the ambiguity, but proposing broad reading of the Act).
207.
Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15
CHAP. L. REV. 23, 36-38 (2011) (quoting § 1013(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1968).
208.
See § 1015, 124 Stat. at 1974; see also Hawkins, supra note 207, at 55.
209.
Hawkins, supra note 207, at 54-56.
210.
Totten, supra note 206, at 126-34.

211. See id. at 132-54 (noting the ambiguity, but proposing broad reading of
the Act).
212. See Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77
Fed. Reg. 42,874 (July 20, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1090).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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provision of consumer reporting products or services, any estimate of
the amount of increased compliance would be a prediction of market
'
participants' behavior."215

Still, the CFPB's power may extend to data brokers and
consumer scoring beyond traditional credit reporting. 16 In 2012, the
CFPB promulgated a final rule on "Defining Larger Participants of
the Consumer Reporting Market. ' 2 17 It promulgated this rule in order
to facilitate "the supervision of nonbank covered persons active in
that market" for consumer reporting. 18 It thus focused its definition

to covered persons with annual receipts derived from the business of
consumer reporting in excess of $7 million.219 It also broadly
construed 'consumer reporting"' as 'collecting,
analyzing,
maintaining, or providing consumer report information or other
account information .

.

. used or expected to be used in connection

with any decision [by another person] regarding the offering or
provision of a consumer financial product or service. '"220
However, the CFPB's coverage includes large exceptions. It
does not include the collection of data that relates to a company's
own transactions or experiences with consumers. 221 The CFPB's
coverage also excludes transactions between a consumer and an
affiliate to another person engaged in consumer reporting; "approval
of a specific extension of credit"; employment decisions;
government licenses; and residential leases. 222 These exceptions,
along with the $7 million threshold, significantly narrow the CFPB's
regulatory scope.

215. Id. at 42,892.
216. Id. at 42,898.
217. See id. at 42,874. The authority to "supervise" nonbank larger
participants of the consumer reporting market is derived from 12 U.S.C. § 5514.
Marc S. Roth & Charles Washburn, Data Brokers Face Blurring Lines, Increased
Regulatory
Risks,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Aug.
22,
2012),
http://about.bloomberglaw. co m/practitioner-contributions/data-brokers -faceblurring-lines/.
218. Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77
Fed. Reg. at 42,874. The final rule explicitly notes that "[i]t does not impose new
substantive consumer protection requirements. Nor does it delineate the scope for
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act related to
consumer reporting activities, or any other Federal consumer financial law." Id.
(emphasis added).
219. Id. at 42,874, 42,876.
220. Id. at 42,884 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(ix) (2012)).
221. Id. at 42,885.
222. Id. at 42,885-87.
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Nonetheless, some data brokers that provide consumer scores
are under the CFPB's jurisdiction in regulating "larger participants"
in the "consumer reporting" area, thus opening the door to CFPB
study of consumer scoring.223 Furthermore, the CFPB has authority
to issue regulations and take enforcement actions with respect to the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's prohibition on financial institutions
from sharing nonpublic, personally identifiable customer information
with nonaffiliated third parties without giving customers an
opportunity to opt out.22 4 The CFPB's enforcement authority
generally is primarily over nondepository institutions and depository
institutions with over $10 billion in assets.225 Moreover, the FTC
remains active in policing the data broker industry and pursuing
226
legislative reforms targeting consumer scoring.
C. Federal Discrimination Law
Outright discrimination offends public values as well as the
United States Constitution. Constitutional equal protection law
precludes state laws that discriminate against women, minorities, and
other suspect classifications.227 With respect to financial transactions,

223. Based on the description of these e-scores in the New York Times
article, see Natasha Singer, SecretE-Scores Chart Consumers' Buying Power, N.Y.
TIMEs (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.con2012/08/19/business/electroicscores-rank-consumers-by-potential-value .html?pagewanted=all&_r0, it appears
that these scores are calculated and provided to other parties to be used "'regarding
the offering or provision of [particular] consumer financial product[s] or
service[s]."' Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Reporting Market, 77
Fed. Reg. at 42,884 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(ix)); see also id. at 42,874 n.8
(defining consumer reporting for the purposes of defining larger participants in the
consumer reporting market); Roth & Washburn, supra note 217 (explaining that
"[o]nly data brokers with more than $7 million in annual receipts resulting from
relevant consumer reporting activities would be subject to CFPB supervision').
224. M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20185, PRIVACY
PROTECTION FOR CUSTOMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 2-3 (2014).
225. Id. at 5. The CFPB's rules still may apply to smaller depository
institutions. Id.
226. Roth & Washburn, supra note 217.
227. John A. Ward III, Note, Husband and Wife Contracts Married
Woman Not Liable on Mercantile or Trading Contract Unless Disability of
Coverture Removed Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 S. W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ.
App. San Antonio 1956, errorref'd n.r.e.), 34 TEx. L. REV. 1094, 1094-96 (1956)
(highlighting courts' applications of covertures statutes directing that a married
woman cannot enter binding contracts). It was not until 1981, however, that the U.S.
Supreme Court finally held that laws allowing a husband to sell or encumber marital
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the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits creditors from
discriminating against an applicant "with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction" on the basis of race, sex, marital status, religion,
or national origin.228 The ECOA thus precludes lenders from offering
substantially different interest rates or pricing structures to those in
protected groups, and from targeting or discouraging applications
from protected groups." 29 Specifically, lenders may not evaluate
applications on a prohibited basis or discriminate against applicants
because their income comes from a part-time job, alimony, child
support, veterans' assistance, or other public assistance. 3 ' Lenders
must also notify applicants of adverse actions taken in connection
with an application for credit in an accurate and timely manner.231
Nonetheless, the ECOA has been criticized as largely
ineffective in addressing the subtle discrimination that occurs with
respect to lending and credit scoring."3 ' The Act essentially addresses
only blatant disparate treatment or the rare disparate impact cases
that are sufficiently well documented.233 For example, a plaintiff may
survive a motion to dismiss where she proves disparate treatment
based on evidence that a creditor used gender-based epithets in
threatening to increase the amount owed on a debt. 3 4 The Act also
may stop a credit-reporting agency from blatantly downgrading
consumers based on race. 3 5 However, even disparate treatment

property without a wife's consent were unconstitutional. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981).
228.
229.

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012).
ALYS

COHEN ET AL.,

CREDIT

DISCRIMINATION

22-23, 25 (Nat'l

Consumer Law Ctr., 5th ed. 2009).
230.
231.

Id. at 54-55, 144.
Id. at 129, 148, 187, 196, 198 (noting that creditors also may not

consider likelihood to have children).
232.

See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood,72 LAW &

147, 173 n. 153 (2009) (noting that "'lenders continue to deny
loans to creditworthy consumers and practice gender and spousal discrimination"'
CONTEMP. PROBS.

despite passage of the ECOA (quoting Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining,"'
and the DiscriminatoryAccess to Loans, Credit, and Insurance:An Historicaland
EmpiricalAnalysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and
State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIGO L. REv. 583, 585-86 (1996))).
233. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 10, 13-14.
234. Sharp v. Chartwell Fin. Servs. Ltd., No. 99-C-3828, 2000 WL 283095,

at *1, *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2000) (finding plaintiffs survived the creditor's motion
to dismiss on their ECOA and FDCPA claims where they had specific evidence of
harassing threats with gender-based and racial epithets).
235.

See

DIXON

&

GELLMAN,

supra note 7, at 10.
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claimants face difficulties in finding and obtaining company memos
or other evidence to prove their allegations.236
Disparate impact cases are particularly difficult to prove.
Claimants bear a tough burden in (1) establishing that the defendant
employed a specific policy or practice in order to discriminate and
(2) demonstrating with statistical data that the policy or practice had
a demonstrable adverse effect on the claimants. 237 Furthermore, in
lending and other consumer contract cases, defendants may easily
hide misuse of biases or stereotypes in determining rates and prices
under the guise of "business justifications. 238 "Discretionary
pricing" is so common and accepted in economic and marketing

236. See COHEN, supra note 229, at 69-71. In addition, women may be able
to use the FDCPA to recover against debt collectors who harass them with threats
against their children or negative comments about their marriages and capacity to
raise children. See Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 866, 86869, 874-76 (D.N.D. 1981) (awarding plaintiff damages under the FDCPA where a
collector told her that she "shouldn't have children" due to her hospital debt); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2007)
(affirming injunction and fines against a company that told female debtors that their
children would see them " 'being taken away in handcuffs,"' and " 'be bringing their
mommy care packages in prison'); Black v. Aegis Consumer Funding Grp., Inc.,
No. CIV. A. 99-0412-P-S, 2001 WL 228062, at *2-9 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2001)
(awarding damages under the FDCPA where the collectors told a mother that they
would take her " 'kids' clothing, "' and hounded her about whether her marriage was
the reason she was not paying her debts).
237. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257, 297-98 (2011) (stating that it is "very
rare for plaintiffs [in disparate impact cases] other than highly sophisticated and
well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail under Title
VII" in the employment context).
238. Masudi v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 07-CV-1082, 2008 WL 2944643,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (dismissing an ECOA claim for failure to meet this
burden of proof, and dismissing the FDCPA claim because the defendant was a
creditor and not a collector). Borrowers also have launched "reverse redlining" cases
against lenders that target racial minority communities for overpriced loans, but
these actions are difficult for plaintiffs and their attorneys to recognize, let alone
prove and bring to successful fruition. See generally Andrew Lichtenstein, United
We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in
Touch with Their Class, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1339 (2010) (discussing reverse
redlining claims); Pouya Bavafa, The Intentional Targeting Test: A Necessary
Alternative to the DisparateTreatment and DisparateImpact Analyses in Property
Rentals Discrimination,43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491, 496 (2010) (discussing
reverse redlining in housing rentals and "substantial difficulty establishing
discrimination under traditional civil rights jurisprudence").
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circles that consumers are bound to fail in any attempts to show its
discriminatory underpinnings and impacts.239
Moreover, the secrecy surrounding the algorithms and
mathematical formulas used to create credit and consumer scores
establish further obstacles to proving discrimination claims regarding
these scores.14' The mathematical models behind the scores are
"trade secrets," or proprietary intellectual property, and therefore
remain a mystery to regulators and the public.241 For example, the
Fair Isaac Corporation that compiles FICO scores does not publish
its mathematical formula and consumers have no access to this
information despite the power that FICO scores have on consumers'
credit access and rates. 24 2
In addition, the algorithms that drive consumer scores and
segmentations are difficult to regulate because they are subject to
change as data brokers gather further intelligence and change their
models based on a broad range of factors and emerging innovations.
Furthermore, subtle discrimination easily persists based on economic
or historical data, and it is tough to show that the data is the result of
continuing
structural
biases .243
Furthermore,
economists,
239. See generally Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary
Pricing,Mortgage Discrimination,and the FairHousing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 375 (2010) (discussing difficulty of proving discrimination in mortgage
cases and the role of "discretionary pricing").
240. See generally Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap:
Protecting "Confidential Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1998) (noting how trade secrets law impedes regulation).
241. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. at 5-7 (amended 1985) (setting
forth the trade secrets law that has been adopted in forty-seven states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
242. See Scores
Scoring and Scoring Solutions, FAIR ISAAC CORP.,
https ://web.archive.org/web/20140214065800/http://www.fico.com/en/solutions/sco
res-scoring-and-scoring-services/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). There are also
numerous blogs and online articles highlighting the secrecy of these scoring models
as trade secrets. See, e.g., Jason Steele, How FICO Scores Are Calculated (Feb. 24,
2012), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/02 12/how-is-fico-calculated.
aspx.
243. Ann C. McGinley, DiscriminationRedefined, 75 Mo. L. REv. 443, 44344 (2010) (highlighting persistence of discrimination at the "subtle level" and
difficulty of proving discrimination claims under Title VII, especially with respect to
gender); Deval L. Patrick, Robert M. Taylor, III & Sam S.F. Caligiuri, The Role of
Credit Scoring in FairLending Law Panaceaor Placebo?, 18 ANN. REv. BANKING
L. 369, 386-89 (1999) (noting how the difficulty of proving lending discrimination
has left it to the U.S. Department of Justice to enforce fair lending laws, and that the
Department has had to focus most of its limited resources on disparate treatment
cases with respect to race).
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policymakers, and even the general public, have come to accept price
segmentation and differentials as reasonable 44means for companies to
set prices based on market risk and demand.
D. State Legislative and Enforcement Action
Many states have versions of the FCRA, and state attorneys
general have asserted their own enforcement actions. However, some
states have been more proactive in pursuing legislation targeting data
brokers on broader levels. For example, a bill is under consideration
in California in response to a court ruling that California's SongBeverly Credit Card Act of 1971, which limits the data that
merchants may retain about credit-card transactions, does not apply
to online purchases and digital downloads.2 45 In the case behind the
court ruling, a consumer sued Apple for requiring personal
information in violation of the Song-Beverly Act.146 The court found
that the text of the bill suggested that it applies only to physical
stores. 247

The California bill under consideration thus seeks to extend
state law limitations on data collection to cover electronic
purchases.148 The bill essentially replicates the text of the SongBeverly Act and adds language to include credit card transactions
involving digital and downloadable products 249 Accordingly the bill
makes it illegal to record personal information with respect to
purchases in-store or online. Merchants may only collect such
information to the extent necessary for completing a transaction or
for other permissible purposes such as fraud or identity theft
prevention.25 ° Nonetheless, even in these narrow circumstances,
244. See generally Anja Lambrecht et al., Price Discrimination in Service
Industries, 23 MARKETING LETTERS 423 (2012).
245.

S.B. 383,

2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); California Senate

Approves Online Credit Card Privacy Bill, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.pmewswire.com/news -release s/california-senate-approves -online -creditcard-privacy-bill-242841641.html. The Senate passed SB-383 on January 30, 2014,
and it was ordered to the California General Assembly. It was read, and then
referred to the Assembly Banking and Finance Committee on April 24, 2014. Cal.
S.B. 383.
246. Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, 292 P.3d 883, 884 (Cal. 2013); CAL. Civ.
CODE. §§ 1747-1748.95 (West 2009).
247.

Id.

248.

Cal. S.B. 383.

249.

Id.

250.

Id. § 3(c)(3)(A).
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companies must destroy collected information as soon as the
permissible purpose has been met.251 Furthermore, the bill also bars
companies from aggregating collected information or selling it to
others. 5

Notably, the bill is quite narrow in that it only applies to
product purchases made "by any means of download to a computer,
'
telephone, or other electronic device."253
This means that the bill
would not apply with respect to the use of a credit card to get a cash
advance or make a security or damage deposit. It also would not
apply to data collection related to delivering or installing special
orders. In addition, online merchants could continue to collect
consumer data with respect to purchase
of downloadable products if
25 4
the consumers opt in to data sharing.
Opponents of the bill argue that it "places over-reaching
restrictions on operators of commercial Internet Web sites or Online
'
Services."255
They argue that the bill imposes undue burdens on
covered merchants by requiring that they notify consumers of the
purpose of their requests for data and use of the information.256 Some
merchants also complain that the bill would thwart efficiency by
requiring them to give consumers an opportunity to opt out of data
collection at the outset of a transaction and again before the
transaction is final.257 Some critics also argue that the bill hinders
merchants in seeking to protect consumers from identity theft despite
its limited allowance for data collection to prevent fraud. 58
In addition, the California Chamber of Commerce suggested
that the bill would impose an "enormous burden[] on online retailers
of digital products because it would require companies to bifurcate
their digital product offerings into two categories depending on the
'
amount of information shared by the consumer."259
The Chamber
further argues that the bill unduly hinders merchants' ability to notify
251. Cal. S.B. 383.
252. Id.
253. Id. § 2 (p) (emphasis omitted).
254. Cal. S.B. 383.
255. S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS: THIRD READING 9 (May 7, 2013),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb 383
cfa 20130528 131545 sen floor.html.
256. Senate Passes Bill Limiting FraudProtection Efforts, CAL. CHAMBER
COM. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.calchaniber.com/headlines/pages/02062014senate -passes -bill-limiting-fraud-protection-efforts aspx
257. See Cal. S.B. 383 § 3(d)(3)(B).
258. S. RULES COMM., supranote 255, at 8-9.
259. Senate Passes Bill Limiting FraudProtectionEfforts, supra note 256.
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consumers about software updates and upgraded pricing, and
presents obstacles to their provision of other online support. 6 ' The
Chamber adds that the bill will harm California-based Internet
businesses by inciting class actions and requiring that there be a
separate system for California consumers.261

In contrast to California, other states' consumer protection laws
have been less aggressive in targeting data brokers. For example,
Colorado's consumer protection law is narrower in its coverage. It
prohibits merchants from collecting and retaining a consumer's
entire credit card number and expiration date after a transaction is
completed. 6 ' The law also prohibits merchants from recording a
social security number (SSN) as identification or proof of
creditworthiness.26 3 A merchant nonetheless may record a credit card
number when a check is issued to pay the amount due on that credit
card, and may record a SSN on a loan application or on a check
issued to pay a student loan. 264
Colorado law also provides additional protections for SSNs
more generally. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act states that a
"person or entity" may not publicly post or display an individual's
SSN, print a SSN on any card required to access products or
services, or require an individual to transmit his or her SSN over an
265
insecure connection on the Internet, unless the SSN is encrypted.
Furthermore, the law protects individuals from having to use their
SSN to access an Internet web site without a password or unique
personal identification number. 66 The law also prohibits entities
from printing a "SSN on any materials that are mailed to the
individual, unless state or federal law requires .. .or authorizes the
SSN to be mailed.1 267 The law nonetheless allows SSNs to (1) be

included inside "applications and forms sent by mail"; (2) "establish,
amend, or terminate an account, contract, or policy"; or (3) "confirm
260. Id. However, the bill specifically allows for data collection to establish,
maintain and upgrade consumers' accounts. Cal. S.B. 383.
261.

Senate Passes Bill Limiting FraudProtectionEfforts, supra note 256.

262.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-3-506 (2013) (adding that a merchant may
record the type of credit card and the issuer of the credit card when a consumer
displays a credit card as an indication of creditworthiness or identification).
263. Id. § 4-3-506(a).
264. Id. § 4-3-506(b).
265. Social
Security
Numbers,
COLO.
ATT'Y
GEN.,
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/initiatives/identity theft/social-security-nu
mbers (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
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the accuracy of the SSN." '68 However, SSNs in these mailings may
not be printed on a postcard or otherwise visible on or through an
"envelope or without the envelope having been opened." '69
States also have brought enforcement actions regarding the use
of data to engage in discriminatory practices to target particular
groups. For example, in State ex rel.Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., the Iowa
Attorney General used statistical analysis to show that "Vertrue's
marketing practices disproportionately affected elderly Iowans" in
selling memberships in savings programs.27 ° The state crossreferenced Vertrue's marketing information "with motor vehicle
division, social security, and background investigation databases" to
show how the company's deceptive marketing practices
disproportionately impacted older consumers.271 The court thus
dismissed Vertrue's arguments that "it did not direct its marketing
plans at the elderly, and programs were not designed to appeal to a
specific age group." 7 ' The court found that even the company's own
internal report noted the disproportionately high percentage of
customers over fifty-five who purchased the deceptive plan at issue,
and thus "Vertrue, at the very least, should have known that their
fraudulent strategies disproportionately affected the elderly." '73
Such cases are nonetheless rare. As noted above, it is very
difficult to prove discriminatory data practices. Data brokers can
generally "blame" discrepancies on the economics or other
complexities of the market. Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding
consumer scores create a nearly insurmountable hurdle for any
would-be complainants to gather the evidence they would need for a
successful claim. Still, policymakers are exploring the discrimination
and data privacy concerns surrounding consumer scores and
segmentations, and appear poised to propose or promulgate
regulations.
III. ROADMAP TO REGULATIONS
Consumers have become increasingly concerned with their data
privacy. Companies scoop up surprising amounts of information
about consumers with little accountability. The Obama
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
834 N.W.2d 12, 18, 44 (Iowa 2013).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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administration has therefore proposed a privacy "bill of rights" to
increase transparency regarding data brokers' collection and use of
consumer data, and give consumers greater control over how
companies use this personal information.27 4 Furthermore, the FTC
has highlighted data privacy and scoring concerns affecting
consumers, and seeks to explore how Big Data affects low income
and underserved consumers.27 5 Indeed, this is an expansive issue.
Accordingly, although companies and consumers derive benefits
from data collection, its use in assessing secret scores and
segmenting society creates public and private harms that
policymakers should address with an aim toward advancing just
policy.
A. Balancing Benefits and Burdens
Do consumer scores and segmentations merely facilitate benign
business or foster discriminatory practices that deserve policy
attention? Information asymmetries are not new in the B2C market.
Consumers usually have less information than merchants regarding
any given transaction and related privacy practices. 276 Indeed,
consumers generally do not realize that data brokers track their every
move, let alone that brokers use this data to determine what offers
and deals consumers receive. 27' Data brokers usually do not notify
consumers that they are gathering the consumers' data in order to
assign consumer scores, and brokers certainly do not reveal or
publicly explain the mathematical formulas or other trade secrets that
drive these scores. 78
Consumers benefit when they blissfully enjoy beneficial deals,
fraud prevention, and innovative offerings due to the growth and
depth of Big Data. 279 Companies benefit from data brokers'
marketing services and assistance in boosting their bottom lines and
274.

See Alexis, supra note 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).

275.

FTC to Examine Effects of Big Data on Low Income and Underserved

Consumers at September Workshop, supra note 34 (announcing the September 2014

workshop to explore these issues).
276.

See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 819-20 (discussing

'information

inequality.' among Jeroen van den Hoven's transparency concerns).
277. Id. at 819 (highlighting a story of a consumer who suffered a credit
downgrade most likely due to his use of a credit card at Walmart, although that was
merely an educated guess because the consumer did not have access to specific
information underlying the downgrade).
278.
279.

See id.
RAMIEZ ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 47-48.
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enhancing consumers' online experiences."' Companies also should
have choice in contracting partners. Freedom of contract remains a
backbone of commercial and contract law. Meanwhile, data brokers
understandably guard their algorithms and models behind consumer
scores as their proprietary business assets they have created through
significant research and development." 1
Nonetheless, overreliance on data-based practices and
assumptions can also harm companies."' Rigid reliance on data and
application of analytics may lead to poor marketing, hiring, and
retention decisions and policies." 3 This is because such reliance on
data ignores the humanity and fluidity of the market.1 4 Indeed,
"humans are messy and irrational," but data-driven determinations
8 5
rely on assumptions that overlook this messiness.1 Successful
company leaders seek 'the elusive sweet spot between data truth
and human truth."' 86 They know that people and their interests
change, and companies must embrace creativity and a growth
mentality in order to prosper in an evolving market.287
For example, a zip code considered less desirable may quickly
become a popular area inhabited by plenty of consumers who would
be lucrative customers. However, companies reliant on consumer
scores based on old assumptions about that zip code may ignore
these consumers or offer them lesser deals. Data does not always
drive the best marketing policies. Open-mindedness is important, and
"a large measure of beyond-the-numbers insight is required to move
past the bits and bytes so easily gathered with today's technology."' 88
280.
See id. at 47.
281.
Id.at 42.
282.
See Rich Karlgaard, Forget Piketty Data Fascism Is the Bigger
Threat, FORBES (May 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/

richkarlgaard/2014/05/07/forget-piketty-data-fascism-is-the -bigger-threat
(explaining how overreliance on data analytics can harm companies).
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id.

286. RICH KARLGAARD, THE SOFT EDGE: WHERE GREAT COMPANIES FIND
LASTING SUCCESS 13 (2014) (quoting Robert Egger, chief designer of Specialized
Bicycles). Karlgaard calls this "taste" and explains how this is a pillar of the "soft
edge" central for companies' success. Id. at 150-72 (discussing taste).
287. See id. at 53-72. Basing decisions on assumptions derived from data
underestimates the changing and often irrational nature of humanity. Id. at 17-18.
288. Id. at 169. Big Data does greatly benefit businesses by informing them
of how individuals are using products and how they behave in the marketplace. Id. at
171. However, algorithms often need tweaking and lazy reliance on historical data
leads businesses to become stagnant and miss opportunities. Id.
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Furthermore, data-driven scores and segmentation may harm
consumers.289 Data-based assumptions may exacerbate class
disparities by favoring the wealthy and sophisticated consumers to
the disadvantage of the most vulnerable populations. 9 ' Algorithmic
classifications skew how companies treat consumers and foster
discrimination when based in part on assumptions related to race,
gender, ethnicity, zip codes, and other data points that consider
economic and educational resources."' These classifications increase
the gaps between consumer "haves" and "have-nots" by leading
companies to offer the "haves"-but not the consumer "havenots"-the best offers and remedies.292
In addition, as noted above, current discrimination law is
limited and largely ineffective in preventing or stopping
discriminatory scoring and classification.293 Reporting law also is
essentially nonexistent with respect to scores used for marketing, and
it is very difficult for consumers to learn about, let alone prove,
discriminatory practices. Claimants face a tough burden in gathering
data and trying to prove disparate treatment, and usually are unable
to show disparate impact.29 4 Moreover, it is especially difficult to
prove discrimination with respect to consumer scoring due to its
protection under trade secret law and the multifaceted data behind
these scores.

95

Consumer classifications also may not target minorities per se
but nonetheless harm consumers under the guise of valid

289. Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data's Different
Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 47, 50 (2013).
290. Id. at 51 (further explaining that "[m]ost of the biggest concerns we
have about big data-discrimination, profiling, tracking, exclusion-threaten the
self-determination and personal autonomy of the poor more than any other class").
291. See id.
292. Id. at 50-52; see also Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 (2013) (also noting how Big Data fails to capture the
preferences and risks for those that do not actively engage with data).
293. Cullerton, supra note 19, at 820-23 (emphasizing how consumer scores
may amount to discrimination).
294. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 237, at 297-98 (noting the difficult burden to
bring a disparate impact case); Plummer v. W. Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505
(9th Cir. 1981) ("A civil rights plaintiff has a difficult burden of proof, and should
not be deprived of what may be persuasive evidence." (footnote omitted)).
295. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 13, at 100-18 (noting the secrecy of credit
scores and dangers of algorithms); Unikel, supra note 240, at 841-90 (discussing
concerns regarding use of trade secrets law to impede regulation).
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marketing.296 For example, a data broker's classification of a
consumer as a "Biker Enthusiast" based on inferences from data
collected online and offline may benefit the consumer when used by
a motorcycle dealership for targeted marking.297 However, this
classification may hurt that consumer when an insurance company
uses it to infer risky behavior.298 Similarly, a consumer may enjoy
receiving sugar-free candy coupons due to data suggesting that the
consumer has a "Diabetes Interest," but suffer higher insurance rates
due to that same categorization.299 Worse yet, these consumers
generally are unaware of these classifications or their impacts and
have no means for contesting their veracity or precluding their use.3"'
While some condone this as usual marketing, it fosters
inequities and hinders consumers' trust in the marketplace.301 Such
injustice also may spread in communal ways and violate relational
norms. Taken to its extreme, scoring based on one's social
connections or "friends" on Facebook creates incentive to avoid
companions and family with less advantageous economic, social, or
professional profiles. Consumers should not be essentially punished
based on who their friends are. This seems to offend basic morality
and asks for consumers to base their social networks on
creditworthiness instead of kindness, love, and familial ties.3"'
B. Proposed Reforms
Most policymakers and commentators have focused on need
for consumer notice that their data is being collected and giving them
choice regarding such data collection.3"3 They target data brokers'
practices and urge them to give consumers the power to learn about
and stop data collectors' overreaching.3 4 FTC Commissioner Brill's
296.

RAMIREZ

ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 48-49 (highlighting the pros and cons

of consumer scoring and classifications).
297. Id. at 49 (providing the example).
298. Id. at 48 (providing the example).
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. (providing the example).
Id.
Id.
See Cullerton, supra note 19, at 826-28 (discussing how consumer

scores may harm relational norms).
303. This may be due in part to the data industry's indication that it would
prefer such a self-regulatory regime over more intrusive regulations, such as broad
bans on data collection. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 590-94 (noting how
privacy policies emerged).
304.

Brill, supra note 198, at 10.
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"Reclaim Your Name" initiative, the proposed Data Broker
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), and the
30 5
most recent FTC proposals reflect this agenda.
1. Reclaim Your Name
FTC Commissioner Brill has announced a comprehensive
initiative called "Reclaim Your Name" aimed at enhancing consumer
choice with respect to data collections.3 6 As she stated in her 2014
presentation at Princeton University:
I believe we need to improve our commercial privacy laws in the US. I
believe Congress should enact three pieces of legislation to help address
these issues. First, I call on Congress to enact legislation that would
require data brokers to provide notice, access, and correction rights to
consumers scaled to the sensitivity and use of the data at issue. Such a law
should require data brokers to give consumers the ability to access their
information and correct it when it is used for eligibility determinations,
and the ability to opt-out of information used for marketing ....Second, I
believe adoption of baseline privacy legislation for the commercial arena
would close the gaps in consumer privacy protections and help level the
playing field among businesses. And third, I think it is increasingly clear
that the United States needs data security legislation.307
As an initial step in the direction of enhanced notice and
choice, this agenda would involve creation of a single portal for
consumers to gain control over the information collected about
them. 30 8 The portal would thus "give consumers the power to access
online and offline data already collected, exercise some choice over
how their data will be used in the commercial sphere, and correct any
errors in information being used by those making decisions seriously
affecting consumers' lives.1 30 9 The portal also would educate
consumers about companies' privacy policies by stating the facts in
simple and straightforward language instead of the incomprehensible
legalese that obfuscates most companies' privacy policies. 310 This
movement has been central in the FTC's data privacy agenda, 311 and
305.
306.
307.

Id.at 9.
Id.at 8.
Id.

308.

Id. at 9.

309.
310.

Id.
Id.

311.
See Julie Brill, Demanding Transparencyfrom Data Brokers, WASH.
POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://article s.washingtonpo st.com/20 13-08-1 5/opinions/4 141

2540 1 data-brokers-fair-credit-reporting-act-data-fuel;

Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed.

Trade Comm'n, Reclaim Your Name, Keynote Address at 23rd Computers Freedom
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Commissioner Brill again voiced support for similar policy
initiatives in her statement on May 27, 2014.312
2. Data Broker Accountability and TransparencyAct of 2014
(DATA Act)
Similarly, Senators Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) and Ed Markey
(D-Mass.) introduced the DATA Act to codify many of the same
data privacy and choice provisions.313 The bill has been assigned to
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where it
remains for consideration before possible presentation to the House
or Senate as a whole.314 This Act would bar data brokers from
obtaining or attempting to obtain information that a data broker
knows or should know to be stolen or false, unless the information is
collected to identify a discrepancy.3 15 It also would require that data
brokers establish procedures to ensure the accuracy of information
that specifically identifies an individual, unless the information only
identifies a name or address.316
In addition, the DATA Act would require data brokers to allow
consumers to review personal information gathered about them at
least one time per year, free of charge.317 Consumers would then
have power to dispute the accuracy of the data collected, and the data
brokers would have to investigate disputes and correct any erroneous
information.318 The DATA Act also would empower the FTC to
establish the aforementioned website with information about
consumers' privacy rights and how consumers may review personal
information and object to its use for marketing purposes.3 19 The FTC

also would promulgate regulations to implement and enforce the
DATA Act and ensure that data brokers create measures to audit
internal or external access to information they collect. 320
and
Privacy
Conference
(June
26,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf.
312. RAMIEZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-3-C-8 (providing an additional
statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the May report).
313. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th
Cong. (2014).
314. Id.
315. Id. §§ 3(a)-4(b)(1).
316. Id. § 4(a).
317. Id. § 4(c)-(d).

318.

Id. § 4(f).

319.
320.

Id. § 5(2).
Id. § 5.
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A violation of the DATA Act would be a violation of the FTC
Act.3 21 Accordingly, the FTC could pursue violators and subject them
to related penalties. State attorneys general and other state agencies
also would have power to enjoin further violations, compel
compliance, obtain damages on behalf of residents of their states,
and obtain civil penalties in an amount no greater than $16,000 per
violation. 22 However, these state actors would have to refrain from
3 3
instituting a civil action during the pendency of any FTC action. 2
3. The FTC'sMay 2014 Proposal
After the DATA Act's introduction, the FTC highlighted its
support for much of the Act's provisions in its May 2014 data broker
report. 24 The FTC echoed the DATA Act in recommending
legislation requiring free consumer access to collected information at
least once per year and means for "opting out" of data collections.325
The FTC also reinforced the DATA Act's and Commissioner Brill's
proposed creation of a central website for identification of data
brokers and links to data brokers' access tools and opt-outs with
respect to data sharing for marketing purposes. 326 The FTC also
urged establishment of measures for auditing or retracting any
internal or external access to data containing collected personal
information. 327 The FTC added that the law should require that
consumers must opt in to allow any data sharing
of sensitive
328
information, such as that related to health issues.
The FTC's proposed legislation would nonetheless differ from
the DATA Act in various ways. For example, the FTC suggested that
the Internet portal requirements should be limited to the largest fifty
data brokers in order to advance its efficacy and help minimize
information overload. 329 The FTC also proposed that data brokers list
clients to whom they distribute collected data and disclose inferences
they derive from such data (such as an inference that a consumer is

321.
322.
323.
324.
legislation).
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. § 6(a).
Id. § 6(e)(1)-(2).
Id. § 6(e)(3)(C).
RAMIREZ

ET AL.,

supra note

1, at 49-56 (discussing proposed

Id. at 54.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 50-54 (adding further detail regarding such proposed legislation).
Id. at51.
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interested in a certain activity based on Internet search history).33 °
Additionally, the FTC's proposed legislation would require data
brokers to notify consumers when collected data adversely impacts a
consumer transaction or prevents a consumer from a potential
benefit.331

The Commission's recommendations also went further to
propose privacy by design.33 This would employ logarithms and
software with privacy features that limit data collection to
information essential for a particular transaction and preclude data
collection with respect to youth under eighteen years of age.333 The
FTC urged that such measures would augment the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act's (COPPA) protections of children's privacy
by extending restrictions to data collected offline.33 4 In addition, the
FTC called on data brokers to establish measures for ensuring that
downstream users of data do not use the data for discriminatory or
other unlawful eligibility 5determinations with respect to credit,
33
insurance, or employment.
It is nonetheless unclear how the FTC's legislation or the
DATA Act would work, or whether such regulations' benefits would
outweigh their costs. For example, the FTC's report noted the
Commissioners' disagreement on creation of an opt-out portal due to
such costs.336 Commissioner Wright voiced concern that the benefits
to consumers of requiring data brokers to provide them with the
ability to opt out of data sharing for marketing purposes may not
337
outweigh the costs of imposing such restrictions on companies.
The report further explained that
although the concept of a centralized portal to provide consumers with
information about the practices of data brokers may be useful in theory,
330. Id. at 52.
331. Id. at 53-54. The DATA Act does not require disclosure of inferences
made from collected data, the names of clients who purchase data, or sources of data
if the data adversely impacts a consumer transaction or potential benefit. See Data
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th Cong. (2014). The
DATA Act does not protect offline data collection from youth under the age of 18,
as proposed by the FTC's recommendation. Id. The DATA Act also does not require
"privacy by design" methods in creating data systems to ensure downstream users
do not use data for unlawful or discriminatory purposes. Id.
332. RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 54.
333. Id. at 55.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 55-56.
336. Id. at 50 n.82.
337. Id. at 51 n.85.
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[Commissioner Wright] believes that the Commission should engage in a
rigorous study of consumer preferences sufficient to establish that
consumers would likely benefit from such a portal prior to making such a
recommendation.338

The FTC's proposed website portal would be limited to the
fifty largest data brokers, but delineating that list could be
problematic. 339 Furthermore, the proposal does not clarify the scope
of data that the regulations would cover, or address consumers'
inertia when it comes to their contracts and privacy. Most consumers
already lack interest in reading their contracts and verifying their
credit reports. It is therefore unlikely that the majority of consumers
would invest the time and resources required to review all
information collected and verify its accuracy. Instead, only the most
resourceful and sophisticated consumers would take on this taskpossibly increasing the gap between the consumer "haves" and
"have-nots."
It is also questionable that creating a system similar to that
under the FCRA would improve the accuracy of data collections.
With respect to credit reports, policymakers have proposed the Stop
Errors in Credit Use and Reporting (SECURE) Act to address
rampant inaccuracies in credit reports and scores by increasing and
expanding the requirements on credit reporting agencies and data
furnishers.3 41 U.S. Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Brian Schatz
(D-HI) proposed this act in the wake of a Consumers Union report
indicating that credit report errors affect 40 million Americans and
can devastate consumers who face significant obstacles in seeking to
correct these errors. 41 Senator Schatz endorsed the act, emphasizing
that tougher measures are necessary to combat "a dark ecosystem of

338. Id.
339. Id. at 51 n.86. The FTC suggested that "large data brokers" could be
defined through rulemaking like the CFPB has done to determine "larger
participants" subject to its examination authority under 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B).
Id. However, such rules leave gaps and it seems especially difficult with respect to
data brokers due to the breadth, depth, and variability that have been hallmarks of
the Big Data industry. Arguably every company could be considered a data broker in
some respects.
340. Sens. Brown and Schatz Announce Legislation Protecting Consumers
Jrom Inaccurate Credit Reports and Scores, BROWN (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.brown.senate. gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-and-schatzannounce-legislation-protecting-consumers -from-inaccurate-credit-reports -andscores [hereinafter SECURE Act PressRelease].
341. Id.
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companies that are not accountable to consumers"
despite their
342
tremendous power in determining consumers' credit
Specifically, the SECURE Act would provide consumers with
free credit scores and empower the CFPB to develop procedures for
credit reporting agencies to follow as a means to improve
accuracy.343 It also would require credit reporting agencies to send
creditors the materials related to consumer disputes and facilitate
effective resolution of these disputes. 344 Sponsors emphasized that
this is especially important to address the reported failures in current
dispute resolution procedures. 345 The Act also would empower courts
to stop a credit reporting agency from reporting inaccurate
information and provide the FTC with increased authority to bar
reporting agencies' poor practices.346

C. Balanced Change
Policymakers, academics, and consumer advocates are
encouraging the data broker industry to take more aggressive action
to protect consumer privacy. It is unlikely, however, that companies
with a monopoly on data collection will take socially optimal action
on their own.347 Moreover, legislative or regulatory action is
warranted to address public harms emanating from unchecked
consumer scoring and segmentation. As the WPF concluded:
Consumer scoring has substantial potential to become a major policy issue
as scores with unknown factors and unknown uses and unknown validity
and unknown legal constraints move into broader use. Secrecy, fairness of
the factors, accuracy of the models, and the use of sensitive information
are some of the key issues that must be addressed. It is exquisitely unlikely
that self-regulation will solve all of the dilemmas consumer scoring
introduces. 348
342. Id.
343. SECURE Act, S.2224, 113th Cong. § 3(e)-(f) (2014); SECURE Act
PressRelease, supra note 340.
344. SECURE Act PressRelease, supra note 340.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Daniel P. O'Brien & Doug Smith, Privacy in Online Markets: A
Welfare Analysis ofDemandRotations 36-38 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 323, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/privacy-online-markets-welfare-analysis-demand-rotations/
wp323.pdf (assessing the transactional costs associated with data privacy practices
and protections, and arguing that effective competition is one tool that would assist
socially beneficial privacy choices).
348. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 7, at 84.

1462

Michigan State Law Review

2014:1411

Therefore, the time is ripe to craft regulations that are workable
and efficient, but sufficiently robust to address scoring's and
segmentation's perpetuation of unfair assumptions and ultimately
discrimination. This should begin with cost-effective notice and
choice regulations backed by enforcement and dispute resolution
mechanisms that prompt data brokers to honor consumers' privacy
preferences. It also should include strong auditing procedures that
hold data brokers accountable for discriminatory or otherwise
improper use of consumers' data.
1. Notice and Choice
Currently, companies often include their privacy policies in the
fine print of their contracts, but such weak disclosure is largely
meaningless because consumers rarely read these contracts or launch
3 49
successful privacy claims based on contract or tort law.
Furthermore, some companies do not even have privacy policies.35 °
The FTC has had to rely mainly on creation of "soft law" through
reports, workshops, guidelines, and settlement decrees with respect
to the enforcement actions it has pursued.351

Accordingly, creation of a notice and choice portal like that
proposed by the DATA Act and the FTC's report is a step in the
right direction toward advancing more meaningful transparency.
This also would comport with most commentators' and courts'
support for disclosure laws that protect freedom of contract while
making consumers responsible for reading contracts and making
appropriate choices.35 It is thus no surprise that regulators advocate

for greater disclosure regarding consumers' data profiles.353 This type
of notice and choice also helps to balance the power in B2C
transactions and interactions.
Nonetheless, such notice and choice is not sufficient to address
discriminatory effects of consumer classifications and segmentations
349. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 591-96. The article emphasizes
that '.broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract
claims' and that tort claims similarly have failed. Id. (quoting Dyer v. Nw. Airlines
Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004)).
350. See id. at 588.
351. Id. at 625-27 (explaining the creation of soft law that is not enforceable
per se but persuasive through various means short of specific rulemaking).
352. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O'Rourke, Defending
Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 105 (2011).
353.
Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not
Fair,66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2013).
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produced by big data analysis. 35 4 Instead, giving individuals notice
and choice may simply perpetuate the growing gap between
consumer "haves" and "have-nots" because the least sophisticated
consumers remain least likely to protect themselves.355 As noted
above, consumers already lack the education, resources, and time
required to read the usually long and laborious fine print of their
contracts, thus making it difficult to imagine that they would have
the wherewithal to access many companies' privacy policies and opt
out.356

Information overload also may drive even the sophisticated
consumers who comprehend privacy policy terms to nonetheless take
no action to protect their privacy. An opt-out portal with overly
abundant disclosures and options would overwhelm consumers,
leading them to make no choices due to confusion, exhaustion, and
lack of patience. Consumers also are apt to be overly optimistic and
assume that companies will interact with them in a fair manner.
They also may assume that they would be sufficiently savvy to detect
and deal with any unsavory or problematic contract terms.358
Furthermore, data devices like cookies could render an opt-out
portal ineffective. 35' For example, the researchers from Berkeley
noted above argue that any opt-out rules must be accompanied by
restrictions on companies' use of cookies that reinstate themselves
36
after deletion as means for circumventing consumers' data choices. o
They further suggest that companies should disclose how they
enhance the information a consumer provides with information
purchased or secured by outside trackers.361

354. Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 353, at 36.
355. See id. at 36-38. Big Data is essentially a "sociotechnical system" that
should be regulated with balanced regulations crafted by policymakers, lawyers,
technologists, and other stakeholders with a focus "on the risks of segmentation
inherent in classification." Id. at 38-39.
356. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine
Print, 99 IOWA L. REv. 1745, 1751-70 (2014); see also Skelton v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing a statute's drafters' concern
that "consumer product warranties often were too complex to be understood").
357. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 356, at 1771.
358. See id. at 1771-74. See generally Schiitz, supra note 18 (further
discussing psychology of consumer contracting).
359. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text (discussing robust
cookies, third-party collections, and other technologies that threaten one's ability to
protect herself online).
360. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 55, at 291-95.
361. Id. at 295.
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As noted above, an Internet portal for disclosure and opting out
of data collection also raises additional practicality and cost issues.
What data falls within the scope of this requirement, considering
how broad "marketing" may be construed? How much will the
system cost for regulators and companies seeking to comply? Who
will monitor the system, and where will the funding come from?362
Again, will these costs and burdens outweigh any benefits of the
system, considering that most consumers already lack time,
resources, and patience to check their credit reports under the
FCRA? Similar concerns underlie Commissioner Wright's noted
objections to the FTC's proposed legislation.363
That said, increased transparency and access to collected
information would help promote brokers' compliance with
regulations and best practices. Many consumers would use the portal
if it is easily accessible, understandable, and reasonably limited in
scope. Accordingly, the portal could be limited more strictly than the
FTC has proposed to include only the largest twenty or twenty-five
data brokers. The portal should be sure to cover and highlight those
data brokers who generate consumer scores or segmentations,
especially those that factor in race, gender, income, and the like. In
addition, industry fees or a tax on revenues from selling consumer
data could cover the costs of the portal.
A limited portal would be more cost-effective and help protect
the smaller businesses with lower revenues from data collections.364
A more limited portal also would help minimize information
overload, especially if portal designers are vigilant to provide a userfriendly interface for consumers. Additionally, it would be more
manageable for regulators to monitor a more streamlined and simple
portal. Again, the aim should be to provide a user-friendly notice and
choice mechanism that provides the greatest "bang for the buck" in
protecting consumers and alerting regulators of possibly
discriminatory use of data.
362. The FTC's staff and funding are quite limited. See Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 201, at 599-607 (noting that there were only forty-five staff in the FTC's
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection in 2010).
363. See supra notes 329-39 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC's
proposal and Commissioner Wright's concerns regarding this requirement).
364. Please note, nonetheless, that determining a "revenue" threshold is very
difficult to begin with, and especially problematic with respect to data brokers with
limited assets and ability to orchestrate accountings to bypass revenue limits.
Moreover, these are merely initial ideas and further research and system design
should follow. This Article seeks to merely open the discussion and inspire ideas.
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2. EnforceabilityMeasures
Furthermore, any portal of this kind should be backed by a
dispute resolution process and measures for enforcing resolutions
and consumer choices. Contract claims based on choices under
privacy policies are generally futile.36 5 It is usually not worth it for
366
consumers to bring contract claims in light of litigation costs.
Furthermore, it is difficult to prove causation or the amount of
damages with respect to data breaches or data inaccuracies. 367 That is
especially true with respect to the emotional repercussions that often
accompany a data breach.
Accordingly, any central data privacy portal should give
consumers not only the ability to opt out of data sharing and access
to the information collected about them, but also the power to hold
the brokers accountable. This could be done efficiently through a
complaint or online dispute resolution (ODR) system that ensures
enforcement of opt-out choices and correction of proven data
inaccuracies. As noted above, the SECURE Act has been proposed
in part to address rampant errors in credit reports that go uncorrected
due to lack of an effective dispute resolution system. 368 The same
problems would likely plague any system with respect to data
collections that is set up without a clear remedy system.
ODR systems are growing in popularity and offer cost-effective
resolution of consumer disputes worldwide. 36' An ODR system could
be linked with the central opt-out and disclosure portal. Through this
link, consumers could efficiently pursue brokers who do not respect
their data collection choices or correct data inaccuracies. This would
allow consumers to use an online stepped process to obtain timely
remedies. This could walk the parties through (1) negotiation; (2)
mediation; and (3) arbitration as needed to ensure a speedy and final
resolution based on the supporting documentation.
365.
366.

Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 595-97.
See id.

367. Id. (noting failures of contract law to address data privacy issues, and
using the failed contract claim of airline passengers who claimed misuse of their
information after the September 11th attacks due to inability to prove damages).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 340-46 (discussing SECURE).
369. Amy J. Schmitz, Introducing the "New Handshake" to Expand
Remedies and Revive Responsibility in eCommerce, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REv.
(forthcoming 2014); Schmitz, supra note 18, at 319-31. See generally Amy J.
Schmitz, "Drive-Thru" Arbitration in the Digital Age. Empowering Consumers
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 178 (2010) (discussing the promise of
and suggesting best practices for ODR).
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Such an ODR system would differ from a general complaint
process by bringing in a neutral third party to facilitate settlement
pursuant to online mediation. It also would engage a third-party
neutral to determine the merits of the complaint if the dispute is not
settled by mutual agreement through negotiation or mediation.
Furthermore, data brokers who do not follow timelines and
procedures for investigating data breach claims, ceasing data
collections, or correcting errors in accordance with the system, could
be fined and/or subject to enforcement action. Additionally, the ODR
mechanism would allow the FTC and other regulators to easily
monitor data brokers' compliance while also providing consumers
with enforced resolutions of their data disputes.370
This ODR system also could build from a complaint process
like that employed by the CFPB with respect to financial products
and service disputes.371 The CFPB's complaint process has been
effective in shedding light on improper credit card practices and has
assisted the CFPB in focusing its enforcement efforts on companies
with poor complaint records and industries fraught with consumer
protection violations.372 The complaint database also is publicly
available, which allows consumers to investigate companies' track
records and assists industries in learning what matters to
373
consumers.
However, such complaint processes still do not ensure that
companies will reply to complaints or provide any redress.374 Unlike
the ODR process suggested above, general complaint processes do
not culminate in a third-party determination on the merits if the
parties fail to reach a mutual resolution. 375 Furthermore, general
370. Again, these are merely initial ideas. Further development and
discussion is essential.
371.
OF

See CONSUMER FIN. PROT.

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

JULY

21,

BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE:

2011 THROUGH JUNE 30,

A SNAPSHOT
2014 (2014)

[hereinafter CFPB REPORT], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407

_cfpbreport consumer-complaint-snapshot.pdf (analyzing consumer complaints
filed according to different categories).
372. Id.
373. Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database:
An Early Analysis of the CFPB's Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &

FIN. L. 343, 345-58 (2014) (discussing the purpose and process of the database).
374. Id. at 350-67 (noting untimely or inadequate responses to consumer
complaints in particular industries).
375.

Id.; CFPB REPORT, supra note 371. The CFPB has proposed adding

consumer narratives to the complaint database to increase transparency. Disclosure
of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,765 (proposed July 23,
2014). They are testing the ability to scrub personal information from the narratives,
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complaint processes do little to prevent companies from ignoring
claims, as they have done with respect to claims asserted with the
CFPB by minorities, elderly, and other vulnerable populations.376
This again augments power imbalances and allows for businesses to
discriminate in terms of the remedies and support they provide to
different consumers. Accordingly, any complaint process must
incorporate robust dispute resolution procedures and enforcement
measures.
Of course, these are merely initial ideas for a cost-effective and
beneficial enforcement system to support an opt-out portal, and
further development is essential. Data brokers will likely resist such
transparency and responsibility regulations, especially those that add
to their costs. It is also unlikely that they will welcome rules that
increase their vulnerability to FTC action. Nonetheless, some data
brokers may embrace such regulations as means for weeding out
those brokers that harm the industry's goodwill. Furthermore, the
benefits of ODR would outweigh its costs, which could be spread
among data brokers. Moreover, an ODR system that is free for all
consumers would allow vulnerable consumers to obtain remedies
and address problematic use of their data.
3. Audits and Accountability Rules
Opt-out and data-dispute measures that empower consumers to
make enforceable choices and data corrections are an initial step in
the right direction. Consumers should take responsibility in
protecting themselves, and a central portal could (1) raise awareness
about data collection and (2) increase brokers' accountability.
However, such measures do not go far enough in addressing
discriminatory effects of consumer scores and segmentation. Those
with the least education and resources are still least likely to access
and benefit from any central portal, even if it is more limited.
Accordingly, any legislation or regulations should include
auditing and accountability measures that aim to stop and prevent
improper and discriminatory use of data. This could begin with
measures like those in DATA Act and the FTC's proposal that
require brokers to establish procedures to ensure accuracy of data
and must consider the risk of re-identification of consumers. Id. at 42,767. It is also
questionable whether adding this information would lead to information overload.
376.

Ayres, Lingwall & Steinway, supra note 373, at 363-67 (finding in their

study of the CFPB's complaint process that African-Americans and Hispanics faced
untimely company responses, along with the elderly).
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collection and legitimacy of data usage.377 As the FTC has suggested,

legislation also could promote "privacy by design" aimed to limit
data collections to necessary information related to particular
transactions and to protect vulnerable individuals such as youth
under eighteen years of age.378
In addition, the FTC's proposed default rules precluding data
sharing with respect to sensitive information could be coupled with
additional duties to protect vulnerable consumers in traditionally
disadvantaged groups.379 Brokers also should be required to establish

auditing and compliance measures aimed to catch discriminatory use
of consumer information for consumer classifications and scoring.38 °
Commissioner Brill noted need for stiffer legislation to address
discriminatory use of data in her May 27, 2014 statement. 381 As she
and the FTC have suggested, these measures could begin with
requiring data brokers' due diligence in preventing discriminatory
38
use of data they share and sell. 2
As noted, some have suggested that the FCRA and ECOA
should be extended to target discrimination regarding not only credit,
employment, and insurance determinations, but also broader use of
collected data.383 However, these acts have not done enough to
combat arbitrary assessments and disparate impacts of credit
scoring. 314 Thus stronger auditing and enforcement measures are
necessary for use of data for credit, as well as marketing
determinations.385

377.
proposal).
378.
379.
380.
381.

See supra Subsections IJ.B.2-3 (discussing DATA ACT and the FTC's
See supra Subsection 111.B.3 (discussing the FTC's proposal).
See supra text accompanying notes 324-28.
See Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 353, at 35-36.
RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-1, C-5, C-7 (providing an

additional statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the report).
382.
383.
384.
Innovation

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting
While Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society,

89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1418-24 (2014) (responding to Professor Zarsky's critique
of their Scored Society article and highlighting the dangers of scoring in light of the
volume, velocity, and variety of information that can affect one's score).
385.

See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 33, at 6-20 (exploring the opacity of

credit scores and lack of meaningful insight over the credit reporting process, and
proposing auditing trails and interactive modeling aimed to assist consumers in
making decisions based on how it may impact their credit scores); Cullerton, supra
note 19, at 820-24 (highlighting continued discriminatory use of data).
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Accordingly, mandatory-and not merely suggested best
practices-should require data brokers to conduct due diligence
before selling or sharing consumer scores to ensure the accuracy of
the information collected and assess whether would-be data
386
purchasers use data classifications in a discriminatory manner.
Such rules also should require companies that buy consumer scores
and segmentations to reasonably investigate the creation and
accuracy of what they buy. 387 These companies should then be
required to file simple reports regarding their use of data through an
efficient online process.
This would place more responsibility on companies with
respect to their direct and ongoing interactions with one another,
instead of relying on consumers' pro-action. It thus would protect
consumers' reasonable expectations without requiring that
consumers vigilantly police onerous privacy policies. 388 Furthermore,
it would remind data brokers on a periodic basis to check their own
systems for improprieties. This could benefit companies by
preventing them from facing expensive regulatory enforcement
actions and consumer complaints or class actions that also harm their
goodwill.389

Auditing procedures also could help regulators ensure the
legitimacy of the automated decision-making systems that underlie
consumer scoring and segmentations. Automated data collection and
decision-making systems take human decision-making out of the
process and are becoming the "primary decision makers" in B2C
dealings without adherence to due process standards. 39" For example,
automated systems have resulted in the unfair termination of
individuals' Medicaid benefits, food stamps, and other welfare
386. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 1, app. at C-5, C-7 (providing an
additional statement of Commissioner Julie Brill with the report).
387.
388.

See id.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 627-76 (emphasizing need to

protect consumers' expectations and how the FTC is already moving in that
direction with its enforcement actions). It is simply unreasonable to expect
consumers to access, understand, and act based on privacy policies-which
companies may or may not employ.
389. Id. at 613. Again, it is true that reporting and auditing measures do
increase costs for companies, perhaps requiring that they hire compliance officers.
However, these costs could be minimized through simple online forms and awaken
businesses' awareness of data breaches of improprieties-perhaps due to particular
employees' poor practices.
390.
See Danielle Keats Citron, TechnologicalDue Process, 85 WAsH. U. L.
REv. 1249, 1252-53 (2008).
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public benefits

denied Medicaid to patients with breast and

cervical cancer based on income and asset limits that were not
authorized by federal or state law.""39 The opacity of automated
systems behind consumer scoring and segmentations may thus
deprive individuals' rights and property without appeal to human
fairness.393
Of course, human decision-making also can harm consumers
due to individuals' conscious and subconscious biases that affect
their determinations. Still, regulations should subject automated
consumer assessment systems to audits to help correct errors in the
systems and prevent improper use of biases and assumptions from
infecting their operations.39 4 For example, regulators should audit
systems that crunch collected data to determine classifications such
as "Urban Scramble" or "Mobile Mixers" (noted earlier with respect
to the FTC's study of Big Data).395 Such determinations are based on
not only collected data, but also questionable assumptions (i.e.,
inferring that a certain zip code connotes lower income or racial
status). 396
Understandably, such reporting and auditing requirements raise
cost concerns. However, the costs of such compliance measures are
not much more than those companies already may absorb under the

391. Id. at 1256-57. Automated processes ease public and private costs, but
they also thwart policy when programmers translate complex data into code using
"[c]omputer languages [that] may be unable to capture the nuances of a particular
policy." Id. at 1257-65.
392. Id. at 1268-72 (noting individuals' reluctance to challenge automated
systems due to "automation bias').
393. For example, digital analytics and processes have resulted in
termination of Medicaid benefits, garnishment of wages, and placement on "No-Fly"
lists. Id. at 1273-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
394. See id. at 1301-13.
395. See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing the FTC's finding
regarding these suspect segmentations of Latinos and African-Americans built on
collected data and inferences); Citron, supra note 390, at 1275-310 (discussing due
process concerns regarding automated decision making).
396. One commentator has advocated for audits of automated decision
making by public agencies (i.e., determination of government benefits) as means for
addressing over-reliance on automated processes and encouraging critical
assessment of computer's specific findings. Citron, supra note 390, at 1275-311.
Private decision-making should not be subject to the same scrutiny as public
determinations, but may nonetheless be open to regulations when possibly based on
bias and unverified assumptions.

Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations

1471

FTC's consent order process.3"7 The FTC's consent orders often
impose reporting and auditing requirements on data brokers, and
require companies to notify "the FTC of any material changes in
their organization[s] that [may] affect compliance.""3 8 Orders also
may impose fines, independent audits, consumer notification and
remediation, and establishment of data-integity or security
programs.3" Legislative or regulatory auditing and reporting
measures would merely broaden these duties beyond the relatively
few brokers that are "caught" through enforcement actions.4 0
Furthermore, any financial costs are justified in light of social
costs of discriminatory practices and brokers' profits from using
consumers' data.40 1 In addition, system expenses could be minimized
through use of a simple online reporting portal and forms that focus
on gathering what information and assumptions go into creating
consumer scores and segmentations. 4°2 Regulators also could limit
their resources to auditing brokers who create or use the most
problematic scores and segmentations, and adding minimal random
audits in order to incentivize companies' compliance.403
Reporting and auditing need not be draconian or overly
intrusive. Companies should continue to use models that benefit
consumers by allowing companies to offer goods and services
tailored to consumers' wants and needs. However, outdated and
shortsighted assumptions based on gender, zip codes, race, and other
such labels are unwarranted. Furthermore, consumers should not be
397. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 613-19 (highlighting how the
FTC's consent order process "commonly [involves] reporting, audit, and compliance
requirements for up to twenty years").
398. Id. at 618-19.
399. Id. at 614-19 (noting additional consent order measures).
400. The FTC currently must generally rely on a showing of a specific
breach of a company's stated privacy practices or violation of the FCRA or ECOA
for grounds to bring actions. Furthermore, the FTC does not have sufficient
personnel or resources to bring all the necessary enforcement actions. Id.at 609,
613. Accordingly, stronger proactive measures are necessary.
401. It is difficult to see how any legitimate economic benefits to the data
brokers outweigh the social and communal harms posed by discriminatory use of
data.
402. Companies will resist disclosure of rubrics or algorithms that are
protected as proprietary information. It will be a challenge to determine when such
protection is proper and if there are instances where public values call for overriding
such protections.
403. This incentive is similar to that with tax auditing by the IRS. Consumers
rationally realize that the IRS does not have resources to audit everyone, but the fear
of an audit incentivizes most consumers to comply with tax reporting rules.
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rated based on their social connections or familial relations.
Companies have access to a vast amount of information that is far
more useful in making predictions than such simple assumptions,
which are often faulty at best.
Admittedly, it will be very difficult to draw lines. For example,
zip codes are sometimes indicative of spending capacity. It is
nonetheless more accurate to consider consumers' specific buying
histories with a healthy realization that consumers living in a lowerincome zip code may have more spending capacity because they are
not dumping all of their resources into their homes or apartments.
Moreover, zip codes today often include a variety of individuals with
a range of incomes and spending behaviors.
In sum, institution of auditing and reporting procedures is
necessary to protect consumers' expectations instead of merely
relying on industry self-regulation.4 4 As other commentators have
suggested, the FTC should consider consumer context and varied
experiences, and push for bolder data protections that go beyond
companies' chosen privacy policies. 4°5 Moreover, it is essential for
regulators to curb the discriminatory use of data that has hidden
under the guise of consumer scoring and segmentation.
CONCLUSION

Data brokers track consumers' information and behavior onand offline, and use this collected data to create consumer
segmentations and scores. Companies then secretly use these
consumer valuations to determine how they will treat different
individuals. Such secret use of consumer data raises significant
social and privacy policy concerns within the larger debate about Big
Data regulation and how best to protect consumers without overly
burdening brokers or restricting data innovations. Indeed, the FTC is
studying the data broker industry and has advocated, along with
other policymakers, for legislation that requires data brokers to
provide greater notice regarding privacy policies and means for
opting out of data collection.
While such proposals are a step in the right direction, they do
not go far enough in addressing the impact of consumer scoring and
segmentation, especially with respect to low-income and other
404.
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See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 201, at 625-76.
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vulnerable consumers. Accordingly, enforcement mechanisms such
as ODR systems should support any notice and choice portal for data
privacy. Furthermore, strong auditing and reporting requirements
should place the burden on data brokers to take reasonable steps to
stop and prevent discriminatory use of collected data. The social
harms created by scores and classifications that employ
discriminatory assumptions outweigh any economic or marketing
benefits they arguably provide. This Article thus invites balanced
legislation aimed toward protecting consumer "have-nots" in the
wake of the Big Data revolution.

